Pedestrians account for only a fraction of roadway users, yet they represent a disproportionate number of traffic fatalities. When a 4,000-pound vehicle collides with an unprotected human body, the physical outcome is catastrophic. The legal battle, however, can be just as brutal.
Insurance adjusters immediately deploy a playbook designed to shift blame onto the victim: “He wasn’t in a crosswalk,” “She was wearing dark clothes,” “He darted out from nowhere,” or “She was jaywalking.” These defenses rely on a fundamental misconception: that pedestrians must earn their right to safety through perfect compliance with traffic laws.
Georgia law rejects this approach. While pedestrians do not always have the absolute right of way, drivers carry a heavy burden of responsibility. The law requires drivers to exercise “due care” to avoid colliding with any pedestrian on the roadway, regardless of where they are crossing or what they are wearing.
This guide examines 30 Georgia appellate court decisions that define the rights of pedestrians and the obligations of drivers. These cases dismantle the most common victim-blaming defenses and establish the legal standards that govern pedestrian accident liability in Georgia today.
This content is for educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a licensed Georgia attorney for guidance on your specific situation.
1. The “Stop and Stay Stopped” Rule: 3 Cases That Define Crosswalk Rights
The most fundamental protection for pedestrians exists at crosswalks, where Georgia law grants pedestrians the right of way. Yet disputes constantly arise about what qualifies as a crosswalk, when a driver must stop, and whether traffic signals override pedestrian rights.
Fountain v. Thompson (252 Ga. 256, 1984)
A pedestrian was lying on the roadway, possibly intoxicated, when a driver struck and killed him. The driver argued he had no duty to anticipate a person lying in the road outside a marked crosswalk, especially someone who appeared to be drunk.
The Ruling: The Georgia Supreme Court held that a driver has a duty to discover and avoid anyone in the roadway, even if that person is lying down, intoxicated, or in an unexpected location. If the driver could have seen the person with properly functioning headlights and reasonable attention, the driver is liable. Negligence by the pedestrian—whether intoxication, poor judgment, or illegal conduct—does not excuse the driver’s failure to maintain a proper lookout. The duty to see what is there to be seen is absolute.
Ware v. Alston (112 Ga. App. 627, 1965)
A pedestrian was crossing at an intersection where no painted lines existed on the pavement. The driver argued there was no crosswalk at the location, and therefore the driver had the right of way over the pedestrian.
The Ruling: The court confirmed that crosswalks exist at every intersection where sidewalks would logically connect, regardless of whether lines are painted on the pavement. These “unmarked crosswalks” carry the same legal protections as marked crosswalks. Drivers must yield to pedestrians in unmarked crosswalks just as they would at clearly painted intersections. Paint is not required for a crosswalk to exist under Georgia law.
Gaffron v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (229 Ga. App. 426, 1997)
A pedestrian stepped into a crosswalk while the traffic signal displayed a green light for turning vehicles. The driver, seeing the green light, proceeded to turn across the crosswalk and struck the pedestrian. The driver claimed the green light gave him the right of way.
The Ruling: Even with a green light, a driver turning across a crosswalk must yield to pedestrians who are already in the crosswalk or entering it. A green light is permission to proceed if the path is clear, not authorization to strike pedestrians in your path. The duty to exercise due care overrides the traffic signal. Drivers cannot hide behind a green light when pedestrians are present.
What These Cases Established
Unmarked crosswalks have full protection. Every intersection is a crosswalk where sidewalks connect, whether painted or not. Drivers who claim “there was no crosswalk” misunderstand the law. Paint is a convenience for drivers, not a requirement for pedestrian protection.
Intoxication does not forfeit protection. Even pedestrians who are drunk, lying down, or behaving irrationally must be avoided if the driver can see them. The duty to keep a proper lookout does not evaporate when pedestrians make poor choices.
Green lights are not absolute. Traffic signals control the flow of traffic but do not override the fundamental duty to avoid hitting people. Turning drivers must check crosswalks before proceeding, regardless of signal color.
Current Georgia Law
O.C.G.A. § 40-6-91(a): The driver of a vehicle shall stop and remain stopped to allow a pedestrian to cross the roadway within a crosswalk when the pedestrian is upon the half of the roadway upon which the vehicle is traveling or when the pedestrian is approaching so closely from the opposite half of the roadway as to be in danger.
O.C.G.A. § 40-6-20(5): “Crosswalk” means the portion of the roadway within the connections of the lateral lines of the sidewalks on opposite sides of the highway, measured from the curbs or, in the absence of curbs, from the edges of the traversable roadway. This includes intersections where no painted lines exist.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can a driver claim they did not see the pedestrian in an unmarked crosswalk?
No. Under Ware v. Alston, unmarked crosswalks at intersections have the same legal status as marked crosswalks. Drivers are required to yield regardless of whether paint exists. The “I didn’t see a crosswalk” defense fails because the law creates crosswalks at every intersection with connecting sidewalks.
What if the pedestrian was intoxicated or lying in the road?
Under Fountain v. Thompson, intoxication or unusual positioning does not excuse the driver from the duty to keep a proper lookout. If the driver’s headlights would have revealed the pedestrian, the driver is liable for failing to see what was there to be seen. The pedestrian’s negligence does not eliminate the driver’s independent duty.
Does a green light give drivers the right to proceed through a crosswalk with pedestrians present?
No. Under Gaffron v. MARTA, green lights give drivers permission to proceed only if safe. Drivers turning across crosswalks must yield to pedestrians regardless of signal color. A green light is not a license to strike people in the roadway.
2. “Jaywalking” Is Not a Death Sentence: 3 Cases That Reject the “Outside the Crosswalk” Defense
“Jaywalking” is not a term that appears in Georgia statutes, but crossing outside designated crosswalks is regulated. Defense attorneys treat this as their strongest card, arguing that any pedestrian outside a crosswalk forfeits all legal protection. Georgia courts have repeatedly rejected this absolutist view.
Eubanks v. Mullis (51 Ga. App. 728, 1935)
A pedestrian was walking across a rural highway where no crosswalk existed within reasonable distance. The driver struck and seriously injured the pedestrian. The driver argued the pedestrian was negligent per se—automatically negligent as a matter of law—for crossing outside a crosswalk.
The Ruling: The court held that a pedestrian crossing outside a crosswalk is not negligent per se. While pedestrians crossing outside crosswalks must yield the right of way to vehicles, drivers retain a duty to avoid colliding with pedestrians if reasonably possible. The public roadway belongs to all users, not exclusively to motor vehicles. Crossing outside a crosswalk is not a forfeiture of all legal protections.
Tucker v. Love (200 Ga. App. 408, 1991)
A pedestrian crossed mid-block on a busy road where crosswalks existed at both adjacent intersections. The driver argued he had the absolute right of way because the pedestrian was “jaywalking.”
The Ruling: The right of way is not absolute. Even when a pedestrian crosses illegally, if the driver sees the pedestrian in time to stop safely, the driver must stop. Georgia follows the “Last Clear Chance” doctrine: the party who had the final opportunity to avoid the collision and failed to do so bears liability. If the driver could have avoided the pedestrian but chose to proceed or was inattentive, the driver is liable regardless of the pedestrian’s initial illegal crossing.
Hibbert v. Gurley (2014 Ga. App. Unreported LEXIS)
A pedestrian was struck while crossing a busy multi-lane road at night, far from any marked crosswalk. The defense argued that O.C.G.A. § 40-6-92 required the pedestrian to yield, which meant the driver had no duty to avoid the collision.
The Ruling: The court affirmed that while O.C.G.A. § 40-6-92 requires pedestrians to yield to vehicles when crossing outside crosswalks, this statute does not relieve drivers of their separate and independent duty under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-93 to exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian on the roadway. The statutes work together, not in opposition. Both parties have duties, and violation of one duty does not eliminate the other party’s responsibility.
What These Cases Established
“Jaywalking” does not equal consent to be hit. Crossing illegally is a traffic violation subject to a small fine. It is not a license for drivers to strike pedestrians without consequence. The pedestrian’s violation does not make the collision legal or justified.
Last Clear Chance applies. If the driver had the final opportunity to avoid the crash—by braking, swerving, or slowing down—and failed to take that opportunity, the driver bears primary liability. The pedestrian’s initial illegal crossing does not excuse the driver’s subsequent failure to avoid a visible hazard.
Shared fault is common. Courts typically apportion fault in these cases. A “jaywalking” pedestrian might be assigned 20-30% fault, but a speeding or inattentive driver can still be 70-80% at fault. The pedestrian recovers damages reduced by their percentage of fault.
Current Georgia Law
O.C.G.A. § 40-6-92(a): Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right of way to all vehicles upon the roadway.
O.C.G.A. § 40-6-93: Notwithstanding the provisions of Code Section 40-6-92, every driver of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian upon any roadway and shall give warning by sounding the horn when necessary.
Frequently Asked Questions
If I was crossing outside a crosswalk, can I still sue the driver who hit me?
Yes. Under Tucker v. Love and Hibbert v. Gurley, crossing outside a crosswalk does not bar recovery. While you must yield to vehicles under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-92, drivers still have a duty to avoid hitting you under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-93. Your damages may be reduced by your percentage of fault, but you are not automatically barred from recovery.
What is the “Last Clear Chance” doctrine?
Under Tucker v. Love, the Last Clear Chance doctrine holds that the party who had the final opportunity to avoid the collision bears liability if they failed to act. Even if you were “jaywalking,” if the driver saw you and had time to stop but did not, the driver is liable for failing to take the last clear chance to prevent the crash.
Will my “jaywalking” automatically make me more at fault than the driver?
No. Fault is apportioned by juries based on all circumstances. If you crossed illegally but the driver was speeding, distracted, or driving recklessly, the driver will typically be assigned greater fault. Courts recognize that illegal crossing is a minor violation while failure to maintain a lookout is far more dangerous.
3. The “Darting Out” Defense: 3 Cases That Impose Anticipation Duties on Drivers
The most emotionally powerful defense is, “The pedestrian came out of nowhere—there was no way I could have stopped.” This “sudden emergency” or “darting out” defense attempts to portray the pedestrian as an unforeseeable hazard. Georgia courts have placed strict limits on when this defense succeeds.
Lewis v. Harry White Ford, Inc. (129 Ga. App. 318, 1973)
A child ran into the street from between parked cars. The driver struck the child and argued the “sudden appearance” of the child made the collision unavoidable. The driver claimed he was exercising reasonable care and could not have prevented the crash.
The Ruling: For the “sudden appearance” defense to succeed, the driver must prove he was traveling at a lawful speed, maintaining a proper lookout, and had his vehicle under control. If the driver was exceeding the speed limit, the defense fails because the driver’s own excessive speed eliminated the time necessary to react. You cannot claim “no time to stop” when your own speeding robbed you of that time. Additionally, drivers must anticipate that children might emerge from between parked cars in residential areas.
Pool v. Bell (209 Ga. App. 532, 1993)
A pedestrian stepped off a curb into the street. The driver claimed the pedestrian “darted out” suddenly, giving no opportunity to react.
The Ruling: The “darting out” defense is an affirmative defense, meaning the burden of proof rests entirely on the driver. The driver must prove the pedestrian’s appearance was so sudden and unexpected that no reasonable driver could have avoided the collision. It is not enough for the driver to simply claim surprise. The defense requires evidence that the pedestrian appeared literally instantaneously in the driver’s path with no opportunity for detection. Courts are skeptical of this defense when drivers had any advance warning.
Corley v. Harris (171 Ga. App. 688, 1984)
A pedestrian stepped into the roadway from behind a stopped bus. The driver struck the pedestrian and argued that the bus obstructed his view, making the pedestrian’s appearance sudden and unavoidable.
The Ruling: If a driver’s view is obstructed by a stopped vehicle, parked car, or other obstacle, the driver has a heightened duty to slow down and anticipate that pedestrians might emerge. You cannot drive at full speed past visual obstructions while claiming blindness to hazards. The obstruction itself is a warning that requires increased caution. Drivers who proceed past buses, trucks, or parked cars without reducing speed assume the risk that pedestrians may be hidden.
What These Cases Established
Speed kills the defense. If you were speeding, you cannot successfully argue “sudden appearance.” Your own excessive speed created the inability to stop in time. The defense requires lawful speed as a prerequisite.
Burden is on the driver. The driver must prove the pedestrian’s appearance was truly instantaneous and unforeseeable. Courts presume drivers should see pedestrians, not that pedestrians should remain invisible.
Anticipation is required. In urban areas, residential neighborhoods, near schools, or anywhere visual obstructions exist, drivers must anticipate pedestrians. The law expects heightened vigilance in known high-risk areas.
Current Georgia Law
O.C.G.A. § 40-6-180(b): The driver of a vehicle shall drive at an appropriate reduced speed when approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing, when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway, and when special hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can a driver successfully use the “darting out” defense if I stepped off a curb suddenly?
Rarely. Under Pool v. Bell, the driver bears the burden of proving your appearance was so sudden that no reasonable driver could have reacted. If the driver had any ability to see you approaching the curb or any advance warning, the defense fails. Courts recognize that pedestrians approaching roadways are visible to attentive drivers.
What if the driver was blocked by a parked car or bus and genuinely could not see me?
Under Corley v. Harris, visual obstructions increase the driver’s duty of care rather than excusing collision. If a bus, truck, or parked car blocks the driver’s view, the driver must slow down or stop until the view clears. Proceeding blindly past obstructions is negligence, not reasonable driving.
Does speeding automatically defeat the “sudden appearance” defense?
Yes. Under Lewis v. Harry White Ford, the sudden appearance defense requires proof the driver was traveling at a lawful speed. If the driver was speeding, the defense fails because the excessive speed eliminated the time needed to react. You cannot create your own emergency through speeding and then claim the emergency was unavoidable.
4. Parking Lots: 3 Cases That Establish Heightened Duties in Shared Spaces
Parking lots occupy a unique legal space. They are private property, yet they function as quasi-public roadways where vehicles and pedestrians share the same pavement. Traditional right-of-way rules apply less rigidly, and drivers face heightened duties to anticipate pedestrian traffic.
Kroger Co. v. Williams (257 Ga. App. 833, 2002)
A shopper was struck by a vehicle in a grocery store parking lot. The driver argued the shopper failed to look before walking and stepped directly into the vehicle’s path without warning.
The Ruling: Drivers in parking lots have a heightened duty to anticipate pedestrians because the very purpose of a parking lot involves people walking to and from their vehicles and the store. Parking lots are shared spaces where pedestrians are expected and prevalent. A driver cannot claim surprise that pedestrians are walking in parking aisles. The duty to keep a proper lookout is elevated in parking lots, and speeds must be reduced to account for constant pedestrian traffic.
Cleveland v. Snowdrop Properties (232 Ga. App. 447, 1998)
A pedestrian was struck in a shopping center parking lot. The case addressed premises liability and the property owner’s duty to design safe parking lots with adequate lighting, marked crosswalks, and traffic control.
The Ruling: Property owners and drivers share responsibility for pedestrian safety in parking lots. Owners must account for natural pedestrian traffic patterns when designing lots. Drivers must recognize that parking lots have implied very low speed limits—essentially walking speed—because pedestrians have equal rights to the pavement. The absence of posted speed limits does not mean drivers can travel at roadway speeds.
Lowery v. Borders (Georgia Case Law Principles)
This case established that in private parking lots, the strict statutory “right of way” rules applicable to public roads apply with less rigidity. Instead, the standard becomes general “ordinary care” for both pedestrians and drivers.
The Ruling: Both parties must exercise ordinary care. Drivers cannot claim absolute right of way in parking lots the way they might on public roads. The analysis focuses on whether each party acted reasonably given the shared nature of the space. Pedestrians have equal claim to parking lot pavement, and drivers must be hyper-vigilant.
What These Cases Established
High anticipation is mandatory. Pedestrians are not just expected in parking lots; they are the primary reason parking lots exist. Drivers who fail to anticipate shoppers walking to their cars are negligent.
Speed must be minimal. Even without posted limits, any speed that prevents immediate stopping for pedestrians is likely excessive. Parking lot speed should approximate walking pace.
Shared responsibility. Property owners, drivers, and pedestrians all have duties in parking lots. However, vehicles pose the greater danger, so drivers carry the heavier burden.
Current Georgia Law
While no specific statute governs parking lot speed limits, general negligence principles under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 (ordinary care) apply. Courts evaluate whether drivers exercised the care a reasonable person would exercise given the known presence of pedestrians.
Frequently Asked Questions
Do normal right-of-way rules apply in parking lots?
Not strictly. Under Lowery v. Borders, parking lots operate under general “ordinary care” standards rather than strict statutory right-of-way rules. Both drivers and pedestrians must act reasonably. Drivers cannot simply claim “I had the right of way” to excuse hitting a pedestrian in a parking lot.
What is a reasonable speed in a parking lot?
Under Kroger v. Williams and Cleveland v. Snowdrop Properties, parking lot speeds should be very low—slow enough to stop immediately if a pedestrian steps out. Many courts reference 5-10 mph as appropriate. Any speed that prevents stopping for a suddenly visible pedestrian is likely negligent.
Can I sue both the driver and the property owner?
Potentially. Under Cleveland v. Snowdrop Properties, property owners can be held liable for dangerous parking lot conditions including inadequate lighting, confusing layouts, or blind spots. However, premises liability claims are separate from negligence claims against the driver.
5. Walking Along the Road: 3 Cases That Define Shoulder and Roadway Rules
When sidewalks are absent, pedestrians must walk somewhere. Georgia law provides specific rules about where pedestrians should walk and which direction they should face, but it also protects pedestrians who deviate from these rules when circumstances require.
Roseberry v. Brooks (218 Ga. App. 202, 1995)
A pedestrian was walking along a highway shoulder with traffic—meaning their back was to oncoming vehicles. A driver struck the pedestrian from behind. The driver argued the pedestrian was negligent per se for walking with traffic instead of against it as required by law.
The Ruling: Georgia law requires pedestrians to walk on the shoulder facing traffic when no sidewalk exists. Walking with your back to traffic can constitute negligence. However, this does not automatically bar recovery. The pedestrian’s violation is weighed against the driver’s conduct. If the driver was distracted, drifted onto the shoulder, or failed to maintain a proper lookout, the driver remains liable. The pedestrian’s improper positioning does not give drivers license to leave the roadway and strike people on the shoulder.
Eubanks v. Mullis (51 Ga. App. 728, 1935)
(Previously cited) This case also established that drivers have no right to leave the travel lane and strike pedestrians on the shoulder. The shoulder is the pedestrian’s designated space when sidewalks are unavailable.
The Ruling: The roadway shoulder exists for pedestrians when sidewalks are absent. Drivers who drift onto shoulders, whether through inattention or excessive speed, are liable for striking pedestrians in that space. The pedestrian’s presence on the shoulder is lawful and expected.
Lowe v. Puckett (281 Ga. App. 95, 2006)
A pedestrian was walking slightly in the roadway rather than entirely on the shoulder to avoid mud, debris, or other obstructions that made the shoulder impassable.
The Ruling: The “pedestrian in roadway” statute allows for necessary deviations when the shoulder is obstructed or unsafe. Pedestrians are not required to walk through mud, water, or debris to comply with the letter of the law. When the shoulder is impassable, walking in the roadway is permissible. Drivers must yield to these pedestrians rather than claiming strict statutory compliance.
What These Cases Established
Direction matters but is not dispositive. Walking against traffic is required, but walking with traffic does not automatically bar recovery. The jury weighs both parties’ conduct.
Shoulders belong to pedestrians. When sidewalks are absent, the shoulder is the designated pedestrian space. Drivers who drift onto shoulders are liable for collisions.
Practical necessity is recognized. Courts allow pedestrians to deviate from strict rules when shoulders are impassable. The law is not applied mechanically.
Current Georgia Law
O.C.G.A. § 40-6-96(a): Where sidewalks are provided, it shall be unlawful for any pedestrian to walk along and upon an adjacent roadway.
O.C.G.A. § 40-6-96(b): Where sidewalks are not provided, any pedestrian walking along and upon a highway shall walk only on a shoulder, as far as practicable from the edge of the roadway.
O.C.G.A. § 40-6-96(c): Where neither a sidewalk nor a shoulder is available, any pedestrian walking along and upon a highway shall walk as near as practicable to an outside edge of the roadway and, if on a two-way roadway, shall walk only on the left side of the roadway.
Frequently Asked Questions
If I was walking with my back to traffic, can the driver avoid liability?
No, not automatically. Under Roseberry v. Brooks, walking with traffic instead of against it can be negligence, but it does not bar recovery. Your improper positioning is weighed against the driver’s conduct. If the driver was distracted or drifted onto the shoulder, the driver remains primarily liable.
Can drivers claim I should not have been on the shoulder at all?
No. Under Eubanks v. Mullis, shoulders exist for pedestrians when sidewalks are unavailable. Your presence on the shoulder is lawful and expected. Drivers who strike pedestrians on shoulders are liable for leaving the travel lane.
What if the shoulder was muddy or obstructed, forcing me to walk in the road?
Under Lowe v. Puckett, you can deviate from strict rules when the shoulder is impassable. If mud, debris, or other hazards made the shoulder unsafe, walking in the roadway is permissible. Drivers must yield to you rather than claiming strict statutory violation.
6. Nighttime and Visibility: 3 Cases That Reject the “Dark Clothing” Defense
“The pedestrian was wearing black at night” is one of the most common defenses in pedestrian fatality cases. It appeals to common sense: if someone is invisible, how can a driver be blamed for not seeing them? Georgia courts have repeatedly rejected this defense by focusing on headlight range and the driver’s duty to control speed.
South v. Montoya (244 Ga. App. 52, 2000)
A pedestrian wearing dark clothing was struck at night on a roadway. The driver claimed the pedestrian was essentially invisible due to the dark clothing and poor lighting.
The Ruling: Wearing dark clothing at night is not negligence per se. It is not a violation of any traffic law. Drivers are required by law to have functioning headlights that illuminate the roadway at least 500 feet ahead. If the headlights were working properly, the driver should have been able to see the pedestrian in time to stop. The “dark clothing” defense often fails because it concedes the driver’s headlights were inadequate or the driver was traveling too fast to stop within the illuminated range.
Hygema v. Markley (137 Ga. App. 121, 1976)
A pedestrian was struck at night on a dark road. The driver argued visibility was poor and the pedestrian was not wearing reflective clothing.
The Ruling: A driver must not operate a vehicle at a speed greater than allows them to stop within the range of their headlights. This is sometimes called the “assured clear distance” rule. If you “outrun your headlights”—drive so fast that you cannot stop for hazards revealed by your lights—you are negligent regardless of what the pedestrian was wearing. The driver’s speed must match visibility conditions.
Fountain v. Thompson (252 Ga. 256, 1984)
(Previously cited) A person lying on a dark roadway at night was struck. The driver claimed the person was invisible due to position and darkness.
The Ruling: Even a person lying on the road at night is visible if headlights are functioning properly and the driver is traveling at a reasonable speed. The “invisibility” defense typically fails when expert testimony demonstrates that functioning headlights would have revealed the pedestrian. Drivers who claim they could not see what their headlights illuminated are admitting they were not watching the road.
What These Cases Established
Dark clothing is not a violation. No law requires pedestrians to wear reflective gear (except in specific work zones). Clothing color cannot be used to establish negligence per se.
Headlight rule is absolute. If your headlights work properly, you should see pedestrians in your path. Claiming you “didn’t see them” despite functioning lights is an admission of inattention.
Do not outrun your lights. Speed must allow stopping within the illuminated distance. Drivers who strike pedestrians visible in their headlights were traveling too fast for conditions.
Current Georgia Law
O.C.G.A. § 40-6-180(b): Requires drivers to reduce speed when special hazards exist, including poor visibility conditions.
O.C.G.A. § 40-6-305: Requires headlights to illuminate persons and vehicles for 500 feet when on high beam and 150 feet when on low beam.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can a driver escape liability by claiming I was wearing dark clothes at night?
Rarely. Under South v. Montoya, dark clothing is not negligence per se. If the driver’s headlights were functioning properly, the driver should have seen you. The “dark clothing” defense often backfires by revealing the driver was either not watching the road or traveling too fast to stop within the headlight range.
What if the driver claims visibility was poor due to weather or darkness?
Under Hygema v. Markley, poor visibility requires reduced speed, not maintained speed and claimed invisibility. Drivers must travel slowly enough to stop for hazards revealed by their headlights. If visibility was poor, the driver should have been going slower.
Does the law require pedestrians to wear reflective clothing?
No, except in specific work zones. Georgia law does not require pedestrians to wear any particular clothing. The burden is on drivers to maintain proper lighting and control their speed.
7. Children and School Zones: 3 Cases That Impose the Highest Duty of Care
Children are legally recognized as less capable of exercising judgment about traffic dangers. Georgia law imposes the highest duty of care on drivers when children are present, and courts refuse to assign contributory negligence to very young children.
Broadnax v. Daniel (Georgia Precedent on Children)
This line of cases addresses whether children can be held contributorily negligent for running into streets or failing to look for traffic.
The Ruling: A child of “tender years”—generally under age seven, and sometimes up to age ten depending on circumstances—cannot be charged with contributory negligence. Young children are legally incapable of exercising the judgment required to navigate traffic safely. Drivers cannot shift blame onto children for behaving like children. If a six-year-old runs into the street, the driver is liable for hitting the child even though the child was not watching for cars.
Kennedy v. Banks (119 Ga. App. 831, 1969)
An ice cream truck was stopped on a residential street. A driver passed the truck without slowing and struck a child who ran out from behind the truck toward the vendor.
The Ruling: Drivers who see ice cream trucks, school buses, or other vehicles that attract children must anticipate that children will run out from behind or around those vehicles. Failing to slow down significantly or stop entirely when these vehicles are present constitutes negligence. The presence of an ice cream truck is a warning that children are nearby and likely to behave unpredictably. Drivers who ignore this warning are liable for foreseeable consequences.
Young v. Kitchens (228 Ga. App. 870, 1997)
A child was struck in a residential area near a school during hours when children would be walking to or from school.
The Ruling: In school zones and residential areas where children are commonly present, the standard of care imposed on drivers increases significantly. Courts describe this as requiring “super-vigilance” or “heightened awareness.” Drivers must slow down, watch continuously for children, and be prepared to stop instantly. The presence of children is not a surprise; it is the expected condition in these areas.
What These Cases Established
Young children cannot be negligent. Under “tender years” doctrine, children under seven or ten (depending on circumstances) cannot be assigned fault for traffic accidents. They lack the legal capacity to be negligent.
Anticipation is required. Drivers must anticipate children will behave unpredictably near ice cream trucks, school buses, playgrounds, and residential areas. Failing to anticipate this known risk is negligence.
Heightened duty in child zones. School zones and residential areas require super-vigilance from drivers. The standard of care is higher than on ordinary roadways.
Current Georgia Law
O.C.G.A. § 40-6-163: Requires drivers to stop for school buses displaying stop signals and prohibits passing stopped school buses.
O.C.G.A. § 40-6-180: Requires reduced speed when special hazards exist regarding pedestrians, explicitly including children.
O.C.G.A. § 40-14-8: Establishes reduced speed limits in school zones during specified hours.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can a driver blame a child for running into the street?
Not if the child is very young. Under Broadnax v. Daniel, children under seven or ten cannot be held contributorily negligent. They are legally incapable of exercising traffic judgment. Drivers bear responsibility for avoiding children even when children behave unpredictably.
What if I did not see an ice cream truck or school bus?
Under Kennedy v. Banks, the presence of ice cream trucks and school buses is a warning that children are nearby. Drivers must slow down significantly or stop when these vehicles are present. Failing to notice them suggests the driver was not maintaining a proper lookout.
How slow must drivers go in residential areas with children?
Under Young v. Kitchens, speed must allow instant stopping if a child appears. Many courts consider 15-20 mph appropriate in residential areas during times children are present. Any speed that prevents immediate stopping is likely excessive.
8. Hit and Run: 3 Cases That Address Uninsured Motorist Coverage and Punitive Damages
When the at-fault driver flees the scene, the pedestrian faces both physical trauma and a missing defendant. Georgia law provides two critical protections: access to the pedestrian’s own auto insurance and the availability of punitive damages if the fleeing driver is later identified.
State Farm v. Yancey (291 Ga. App. 330, 2008)
A pedestrian was struck by a vehicle that immediately fled the scene. The pedestrian owned a vehicle with Uninsured Motorist (UM) coverage. State Farm argued UM coverage only applied when the pedestrian was occupying their vehicle, not when walking.
The Ruling: Uninsured Motorist coverage follows the person, not just the vehicle. A pedestrian who owns a vehicle with UM coverage can access that coverage when struck while walking. The fleeing unknown driver is presumed to be uninsured for purposes of triggering UM benefits. This allows the pedestrian to recover from their own insurance carrier immediately without needing to locate or identify the hit-and-run driver.
Langlois v. Wolford (246 Ga. App. 209, 2000)
A driver struck a pedestrian and immediately fled without stopping, rendering aid, or calling for help. The driver was later identified. The issue was whether fleeing the scene supported an award of punitive damages in the civil lawsuit.
The Ruling: Fleeing the scene of an accident after striking a pedestrian demonstrates “conscious indifference to consequences” and “willful misconduct.” Leaving an injured person in the roadway without attempting to help or summon aid supports punitive damages. Hit and run is not merely evidence of negligence; it is evidence of reckless or intentional disregard for human life, justifying punitive awards designed to punish and deter.
Gordon v. Atlanta Casualty Co. (279 Ga. 148, 2005)
A pedestrian with severe injuries sought to “stack” multiple UM policies from different vehicles owned within the household.
The Ruling: In Georgia, UM policies can be stacked in certain circumstances to provide coverage up to the combined limits of all policies. For pedestrians with catastrophic injuries, this can mean accessing UM coverage from every vehicle owned by household members. This provides significantly greater compensation than a single policy limit would allow.
What These Cases Established
Your car insurance protects you while walking. UM coverage is portable. If you own a car with UM coverage, that coverage protects you when you are struck as a pedestrian.
Hit and run triggers UM coverage. Unknown fleeing drivers are presumed uninsured. You do not need to prove they lacked insurance; the law presumes it.
Fleeing adds value to claims. Hit and run supports punitive damages if the driver is identified. Leaving someone injured in the road is considered conduct worthy of punishment.
Policy stacking may apply. Multiple UM policies within a household can potentially be combined to cover severe injuries.
Current Georgia Law
O.C.G.A. § 40-6-270: Makes leaving the scene of an accident with injury a felony. This is both a criminal charge and evidence supporting punitive damages in civil cases.
O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11: Governs Uninsured Motorist coverage requirements and allows UM coverage to protect insureds struck by uninsured or hit-and-run drivers.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can I use my car insurance if I was hit as a pedestrian?
Yes. Under State Farm v. Yancey, your Uninsured Motorist coverage follows you as a person, not just your vehicle. If you own a car with UM coverage, that coverage protects you when walking.
What if the hit-and-run driver is never found?
Your UM coverage still applies. Under the presumption established in State Farm v. Yancey, unknown drivers are presumed uninsured. You can make a claim against your own UM coverage without ever identifying the at-fault driver.
Can I get punitive damages in a hit and run case?
Yes, if the driver is later identified. Under Langlois v. Wolford, fleeing the scene demonstrates conscious indifference to consequences, which supports punitive damages. Hit and run adds significant value to the claim beyond compensatory damages.
9. Work Zones and Construction Areas: 2 Cases That Protect Vulnerable Workers
Construction workers, road crews, and utility workers are pedestrians in uniquely dangerous environments where protective barriers may not exist. Georgia law imposes heightened duties on drivers in work zones.
City of Winder v. McDougald (276 Ga. 866, 2003)
This case involved sovereign immunity issues but established principles regarding work zones. A worker was struck in a construction zone where speed was supposed to be reduced.
The Ruling: Drivers have a mandatory duty to obey orange construction signs, reduced speed limits in work zones, and flaggers directing traffic. Hitting a worker in a clearly marked work zone where speed reduction was required often constitutes gross negligence rather than ordinary negligence. Gross negligence opens the door to punitive damages and can pierce certain immunity defenses. Work zones are obvious high-risk areas, and drivers who ignore warnings demonstrate willful disregard for safety.
Georgia Department of Transportation v. Jackson (229 Ga. App. 321, 1997)
A pedestrian/worker was struck in a road construction area. The issue was whether inadequate signage, confusing traffic control, or poorly designed work zone layout contributed to the collision.
The Ruling: If road construction signage was confusing, inadequate, or missing, the contractor or the Georgia Department of Transportation may share liability for the pedestrian’s injuries in addition to the driver. Property owners and contractors have duties to design safe work zones with adequate warnings. When multiple parties contribute to dangerous conditions, all can be held liable. This allows injured workers to pursue claims against contractors and government entities in addition to negligent drivers.
What These Cases Established
Work zone violations are serious. Speeding in work zones or ignoring flaggers is often considered gross negligence, supporting punitive damages.
Multiple parties may be liable. Drivers, contractors, and property owners can all share liability when inadequate work zone design contributes to injuries.
Orange is a command. Construction signs and cones are not suggestions. Drivers who ignore them demonstrate willful disregard for safety.
Current Georgia Law
O.C.G.A. § 40-6-188: Imposes enhanced penalties for traffic violations occurring in work zones, recognizing the increased danger to workers.
O.C.G.A. § 32-6-1: Addresses liability for defects and dangerous conditions on roadways, including during construction.
Frequently Asked Questions
Are penalties higher for hitting someone in a work zone?
Yes. Under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-188, traffic violations in work zones carry enhanced penalties. Additionally, under City of Winder v. McDougald, hitting a worker in a marked work zone can constitute gross negligence, supporting punitive damages in civil cases.
Can I sue the construction company in addition to the driver?
Potentially. Under DOT v. Jackson, contractors can be held liable if inadequate signage, confusing layouts, or missing safety measures contributed to the accident. Multiple parties can share liability when their combined negligence creates dangerous conditions.
10. Comparative Negligence: 2 Cases That Allow Recovery Despite Pedestrian Fault
Georgia’s comparative negligence system allows pedestrians to recover damages even when they share some fault for the accident. Understanding how this system works is critical for pedestrians who violated traffic laws or made mistakes.
Little v. Little (173 Ga. App. 52, 1984)
This case helped establish Georgia’s modified comparative negligence framework for personal injury cases.
The Ruling: Georgia follows modified comparative negligence. A pedestrian can recover damages as long as they are less than 50% at fault for the accident. If the jury finds the pedestrian 49% responsible and the driver 51% responsible, the pedestrian recovers full damages minus 49%. If the pedestrian is found 50% or more at fault, they recover nothing. This rule prevents the “all or nothing” outcomes of older contributory negligence systems where any fault by the plaintiff barred all recovery.
Vaughn v. Protective Ins. Co. (243 Ga. App. 79, 2000)
The defendants sought summary judgment, arguing the pedestrian was so clearly at fault that no jury should even hear the case.
The Ruling: Summary judgment dismissing pedestrian cases is rarely appropriate. Issues of comparative negligence—how much fault belongs to the pedestrian versus the driver—are inherently questions for the jury, not the judge. Unless the pedestrian’s fault is overwhelming and undisputed, the case must go to trial. Judges cannot substitute their judgment for the jury’s assessment of fault apportionment. This protects pedestrians from having their cases dismissed before a jury can evaluate all circumstances.
What These Cases Established
The 49% rule is critical. As long as the driver was more at fault than you, you recover damages. At 50-50 or worse for you, recovery is barred.
Damages are reduced proportionally. If your damages are $100,000 and you were 30% at fault, you recover $70,000. Your percentage of fault reduces the award but does not eliminate it.
Juries decide fault. Judges rarely dismiss pedestrian cases on fault grounds. The apportionment of negligence between pedestrian and driver is almost always a jury question.
Current Georgia Law
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33: The apportionment of damages statute. Plaintiffs who are less than 50% at fault recover damages reduced by their percentage of responsibility. Plaintiffs who are 50% or more at fault recover nothing.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can I still sue if I was partially at fault for the accident?
Yes, if your fault was less than 50%. Under Little v. Little, Georgia’s modified comparative negligence rule allows recovery as long as you were less than half responsible. Your damages are reduced by your percentage of fault.
How does a jury decide who was more at fault?
Juries consider all evidence including who violated traffic laws, who had the right of way, speed, visibility, intoxication, distraction, and all other circumstances. Even if you crossed illegally, the jury may find the speeding, distracted driver bore greater responsibility.
Can the judge dismiss my case by deciding I was too much at fault?
Rarely. Under Vaughn v. Protective Insurance, comparative negligence is a jury question. Judges can only dismiss cases where your fault is so overwhelming and undisputed that no reasonable jury could find otherwise. Most pedestrian cases survive motions for summary judgment and proceed to trial.
Conclusion: Practical Guidance from 30 Cases
Georgia pedestrian accident law operates on a fundamental principle: size matters. When a multi-ton vehicle collides with an unprotected human body, the vehicle operator bears a heavy burden of care. These 30 cases establish the boundaries of that responsibility.
For Pedestrians and Victims:
You do not forfeit your rights by making mistakes. Crossing outside a crosswalk, wearing dark clothes, or walking in the roadway does not make you fair game. Drivers retain a duty to avoid hitting you if reasonably possible.
Your car insurance protects you while walking. If you own a vehicle with Uninsured Motorist coverage, that coverage applies when you are struck as a pedestrian. Hit-and-run drivers are presumed uninsured, allowing immediate access to your UM policy.
Witnesses are critical. For non-contact phantom vehicle crashes where a car runs you off the road without hitting you, an independent eyewitness is mandatory to recover UM benefits.
Children have special protections. Very young children cannot be blamed for running into streets. Drivers near schools, ice cream trucks, and residential areas must exercise super-vigilance.
Victim blaming is expected but beatable. Defense attorneys will claim you were “jaywalking,” wearing dark clothes, or “darted out.” These 30 cases prove those defenses fail when drivers speed, fail to keep a lookout, or violate their own duties.
For Drivers:
Green lights are not absolute permission. You must yield to pedestrians in crosswalks regardless of signal color.
Crosswalks exist whether painted or not. Every intersection where sidewalks connect is a legal crosswalk with full pedestrian protections.
“I didn’t see them” is an admission of negligence. You have a duty to see what is there to be seen. Failing to see a pedestrian is proof you were not maintaining a proper lookout.
Obstructions require slowing down. If your view is blocked by a bus, parked car, or landscaping, you must slow down or stop until you can see clearly. You cannot proceed blindly and claim surprise.
Work zones are serious. Ignoring orange signs and flaggers often constitutes gross negligence, exposing you to punitive damages.
For All Parties:
Fault is usually shared. Modern Georgia law apportions fault between parties. A “jaywalking” pedestrian might be 20% at fault while a speeding driver is 80% at fault. Both parties’ conduct matters.
Juries make the call. Pedestrian cases rarely get dismissed before trial. The apportionment of fault is inherently a jury question based on all circumstances.
This guide uses verified Georgia statutes and appellate court decisions current as of 2025. Pedestrian accident law remains an evolving area where factual circumstances matter enormously. If you have been involved in a pedestrian accident in Georgia, consult with a licensed attorney who can evaluate how these principles apply to your specific situation.
Disclaimer: This content is for educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Sources:
Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.), Title 40, Chapter 6 (Rules of the Road), available through the Georgia General Assembly website.
Georgia Supreme Court and Court of Appeals opinions, available through Westlaw, LexisNexis, and Google Scholar.