Premises liability cases face aggressive resistance from insurance companies that deploy a consistent playbook: “You should have watched where you were going,” “The hazard was obvious,” or “We just cleaned that area.” These cases are systematically undervalued and vigorously defended.
The central misconception is that property owners are insurers of visitor safety. In Georgia, this is false. Property owners are not automatically liable when someone gets hurt on their property. However, they are also not free to ignore hazards or blame victims for not staring at their feet while shopping.
Georgia law operates on a principle called “Superior Knowledge.” Generally, to hold a property owner liable, an injured person must prove the owner knew or should have known about the hazard, while the injured person did not know and could not have discovered it through reasonable care. This framework creates a battlefield where evidence of what the owner knew and when they knew it determines the outcome.
Before 1997, Georgia courts routinely dismissed these cases at summary judgment, ruling that any person who failed to look continuously downward was negligent as a matter of law. The landmark Robinson v. Kroger decision fundamentally shifted this burden, establishing that shoppers are entitled to look at merchandise displays and shelves rather than maintaining constant surveillance of the floor beneath their feet.
This guide examines 30 Georgia appellate court decisions that define the duties of property owners, the rights of invitees, and the legal standards that separate legitimate claims from cases properly dismissed. These decisions dismantle common victim-blaming defenses and provide the framework for understanding when property owners can be held accountable.
This content is for educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a licensed Georgia attorney for guidance on your specific situation.
1. The Robinson Revolution: 3 Cases That Transformed Georgia Premises Law
Before 1997, Georgia premises liability law was effectively dead for plaintiffs. Trial courts routinely granted summary judgment to defendants on the theory that any plaintiff who failed to maintain constant visual surveillance of the floor was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in Robinson fundamentally altered this landscape.
Robinson v. Kroger Co. (268 Ga. 735, 1997)
A customer slipped on a foreign substance while shopping in a Kroger grocery store. The trial court granted summary judgment to Kroger, finding that if the customer had been looking at the floor rather than at merchandise or other customers, she would have seen the substance and avoided it. Therefore, the court ruled, her failure to look down constituted negligence that barred recovery.
The Ruling: The Georgia Supreme Court reversed in a landmark decision that revolutionized premises liability law. The court held that an invitee’s failure to constantly observe the floor is not negligence per se. Shoppers naturally and reasonably look at merchandise displays, price signs, other customers, and their shopping companions. Requiring constant downward observation would make shopping impossible. The burden of proving the plaintiff’s negligence rests on the defendant, not on the plaintiff to prove they were exercising care. Most critically, the court ruled that whether a plaintiff exercised ordinary care is typically a question for the jury, not the judge. This decision restored premises liability as a viable cause of action in Georgia and prevented the routine dismissal of cases before trial.
Alterman Foods, Inc. v. Ligon (246 Ga. 620, 1980)
A customer fell in a grocery store and claimed the floor was inherently dangerous because it was too slippery due to wax or polish. The customer could not identify any specific foreign substance or defect but argued the floor itself was negligently maintained.
The Ruling: The court held that merely showing a floor was waxed, polished, or shiny does not establish negligence. Property owners are entitled to maintain clean, polished floors. To recover, the plaintiff must prove either that the wax was applied negligently such as in excessive amounts creating a skating-rink effect or that a specific defect existed, such as a wet spot, wax buildup, or debris. General testimony that “the floor was slippery” without evidence of a specific hazardous condition is insufficient to create a jury question. This case establishes that not every fall creates liability; the plaintiff must identify what caused the fall.
American Multi-Cinema, Inc. v. Brown (285 Ga. 442, 2009)
A movie theater patron slipped and fell. The case clarified the specific elements required to establish premises liability in Georgia following the Robinson decision.
The Ruling: The court articulated the definitive two-prong test for premises liability cases in Georgia. To recover damages, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard; and (2) the plaintiff lacked knowledge of the hazard despite the exercise of ordinary care, due to actions or conditions within the control of the owner/occupier. This test codifies the “superior knowledge” requirement. Both prongs must be proven. If the owner did not know about the hazard, or if the plaintiff knew or should have known about it, the claim fails. This decision provides the analytical framework that governs all Georgia premises liability cases.
What These Cases Established
Looking ahead is not negligence. Under Robinson, the law recognizes that shoppers naturally look at merchandise, signs, and other people while shopping. Requiring constant floor observation would be unreasonable and contrary to the owner’s own business interests in displaying merchandise.
Shiny does not mean defective. Under Alterman Foods, property owners can maintain clean, polished floors. The plaintiff must identify a specific hazard: a spill, excessive wax, debris, or structural defect, not merely claim the floor was “slippery.”
The two-prong test is mandatory. Under American Multi-Cinema, both elements must be proven: owner knowledge and plaintiff lack of knowledge. This creates the “superior knowledge” framework that defines all premises cases.
Current Georgia Law
O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1: A person who owns or occupies real property owes those who enter the property by express or implied invitation the duty to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe. This duty requires the owner to keep the premises in a safe condition or to warn of hazards that are not obvious.
Frequently Asked Questions
Did Robinson v. Kroger make premises liability cases easier to win?
Yes and no. Robinson prevented the routine dismissal of cases before trial, ensuring that questions about whether the plaintiff exercised ordinary care would be decided by juries rather than judges. However, plaintiffs still must prove both prongs of the American Multi-Cinema test. The case restored premises liability as a viable cause of action but did not eliminate the plaintiff’s burden of proof.
Can I sue if I don’t know what caused me to fall?
It is very difficult. Under Alterman Foods, you must identify the specific hazard. If you cannot describe what you slipped on or tripped over, if you simply “fell,” courts often rule there is no proof of a defective condition. Testimony like “I don’t know what happened, I just fell” typically results in summary judgment for the defendant.
What if I saw the hazard but forgot about it?
If you saw the hazard and voluntarily encountered it, you likely fail the second prong of the American Multi-Cinema test because you had knowledge of the danger. However, if you were distracted by store displays or conditions created by the owner, you may still recover despite seeing the hazard.
2. Constructive Knowledge: 3 Cases That Define “Should Have Known”
Direct evidence of actual knowledge, such as a manager admitting they saw a spill and ignored it, is rare. Most premises liability cases rely on constructive knowledge: proving the owner should have known about the hazard because it existed long enough to be discovered through reasonable inspection, or because employees were in the immediate vicinity.
Food Lion, Inc. v. Walker (290 Ga. App. 574, 2008)
A customer slipped on water in the produce section of a grocery store. An employee was stocking produce shelves approximately five to ten feet away at the time of the fall. The employee testified he did not see any water on the floor and was unaware of the spill. Food Lion argued it could not be liable because no one had actual knowledge of the water.
The Ruling: Constructive knowledge can be established through circumstantial evidence showing an employee was in the immediate vicinity of the hazard with an opportunity to observe and remedy it. If an employee is working a few feet from a hazard and could reasonably be expected to see it during the normal course of their duties, a jury may infer the owner had constructive knowledge. The law does not require the plaintiff to prove the employee actually saw the hazard; proximity creates an inference of knowledge that survives summary judgment. The term “immediate vicinity” means close enough that the employee would encounter the hazard while performing their assigned tasks in that area.
Kroger Co. v. Brooks (231 Ga. App. 650, 1998)
A customer slipped on a crushed grape on the floor of a produce department. Kroger produced inspection logs showing an employee had swept and inspected the produce section 15 minutes before the customer’s fall. The logs documented that the floor was clean at that time.
The Ruling: A property owner can defeat a claim of constructive knowledge by demonstrating both that reasonable inspection procedures exist and that those procedures were actually followed at the relevant time. If credible evidence shows the area was inspected shortly before the incident and no hazard was present, the owner is not liable for substances that appeared after the inspection. However, this defense requires documentary proof, typically inspection logs signed by employees, not merely testimony that inspections “generally” occur. The inspection must have been reasonably recent given the nature of the business and the area in question.
Sharpe v. Jackson (254 Ga. App. 397, 2002)
A customer fell on a foreign substance in a store. The plaintiff could not produce any evidence regarding how long the substance had been on the floor. No employees were nearby, and there was no evidence of the substance’s condition that might indicate its age.
The Ruling: To establish constructive knowledge based on the duration a hazard existed, the plaintiff must present evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the hazard was present long enough for the owner to discover and remedy it through reasonable inspection. Circumstantial evidence might include testimony that a liquid substance was sticky or had dried around the edges, indicating it had been there for a substantial time. Debris with footprints through it or shopping cart tracks suggests multiple people encountered it without reporting it, indicating duration. Without any evidence of time, summary judgment for the defendant is appropriate because the plaintiff has not met their burden on the first prong of the American Multi-Cinema test.
What These Cases Established
Proximity creates inference. Under Food Lion v. Walker, if employees are working near a hazard, the law allows juries to infer constructive knowledge even without proof anyone actually saw it. The employee’s presence in the immediate area shifts the burden to the defendant to explain why the hazard was not discovered.
Inspection logs are powerful shields. Under Kroger v. Brooks, documented inspection procedures that were actually followed can defeat constructive knowledge claims. However, the logs must be credible, contemporaneous, and specific. Vague testimony about “routine” inspections without documentation is insufficient.
Time evidence is essential. Under Sharpe, plaintiffs must present some evidence, even circumstantial, regarding how long the hazard existed. Testimony about the appearance of the substance (dried, sticky, tracked through) provides this evidence and keeps the case alive for the jury.
Current Georgia Law
While no specific statute defines “constructive knowledge,” O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 imposes a duty of ordinary care, which implicitly requires property owners to conduct reasonable inspections at intervals appropriate to the nature of the business and the area in question. High-traffic areas require more frequent inspection than low-traffic areas.
Frequently Asked Questions
How do I prove how long a spill was on the floor?
Circumstantial evidence is critical. Under Sharpe, if a liquid has dried around the edges, appears sticky rather than wet, has footprints or shopping cart tracks through it, or has accumulated debris, these facts suggest the substance was present long enough that reasonable inspection should have discovered it. Expert testimony about drying times can also establish duration.
What if the store employee says they “just checked” the area?
Under Brooks, the defendant must prove the inspection occurred with credible evidence. If the employee testifies they inspected but there is no documentation, or if surveillance video shows they walked through without actually looking at the floor, their testimony may be insufficient. Plaintiffs can challenge the credibility and thoroughness of claimed inspections.
Is 15 minutes between inspections always reasonable?
Not necessarily. While Brooks indicates 15-minute intervals can be reasonable for grocery produce sections, other areas may require different standards. Store entrances on rainy days, restroom entrances, or areas near drink fountains may require more frequent inspection. Reasonableness depends on the likelihood of hazards appearing in that specific location.
3. The Rainy Day Doctrine: 3 Cases That Address Weather-Related Falls
Georgia courts recognize that tracking water into buildings during rain is inevitable. The so-called “Rainy Day Doctrine” reflects the principle that property owners cannot be held strictly liable for the natural consequences of weather. However, this doctrine has important limits and does not provide blanket immunity.
Walker v. Sears Roebuck & Co. (278 Ga. App. 677, 2006)
A customer slipped on tracked-in rainwater near the entrance of a Sears store on a day when heavy rain was falling. The store had placed absorbent mats at the entrance and posted “Wet Floor” warning signs. The customer argued the store should have had employees continuously mopping the entrance area.
The Ruling: Property owners are not insurers of their visitors’ safety. During rain, it is impossible to keep entrance areas completely dry when customers are continuously entering and tracking in water. An owner fulfills its duty of ordinary care by taking reasonable precautions such as placing absorbent mats at entrances and posting warning signs alerting customers to wet conditions. The law does not require owners to station employees at entrances to continuously mop or to somehow prevent water from entering during a rainstorm. If reasonable measures are taken, the owner is generally not liable for slips on tracked-in rainwater at entrance areas.
Hack-A-Way v. Belcher (289 Ga. App. 518, 2008)
A customer slipped on water just inside a store entrance on a day when rain was falling heavily. The customer testified she did not know the floor was wet and was not warned. She argued the store’s failure to adequately warn of the wet conditions created liability.
The Ruling: When it is actively raining, all persons entering a building are presumed to have equal knowledge that entrance areas may be wet from tracked-in water. The weather itself serves as a warning. A customer who enters a building during a rainstorm cannot claim surprise that the floor near the entrance is wet. This presumption of equal knowledge satisfies the second prong of the American Multi-Cinema test: the plaintiff cannot claim they lacked knowledge of a danger that was obvious from the weather conditions. The Rainy Day Doctrine holds that wet entrance floors during rain are not hazards requiring additional warning beyond the observable rain itself.
Emory University v. Smith (260 Ga. App. 900, 2003)
A visitor slipped and fell on a rainy day, but the fall occurred well inside a building, approximately 30 feet beyond the entrance mats, in an area where customers would not naturally expect water accumulation.
The Ruling: The Rainy Day Doctrine has geographic limits. While the doctrine protects owners from liability for wet conditions at immediate entrance areas where tracked-in rain naturally accumulates, it does not extend to areas deep inside buildings where visitors would not expect water. If water tracking extends significantly beyond the mat area, or if water accumulates in interior locations not adjacent to entrances, the owner may be liable for failing to mop or warn. The doctrine protects the immediate transition area between outdoors and indoors; it does not provide immunity for water hazards throughout the entire premises. When water extends into areas where it would not naturally be expected despite rain, the owner’s duty to clean or warn is triggered.
What These Cases Established
Rain itself is notice. Under Hack-A-Way, active rainfall puts all entrants on notice that entrance areas may be wet. This establishes equal knowledge, which defeats the second prong of premises liability.
Reasonable precautions suffice. Under Walker, mats and warning signs are generally sufficient to satisfy the owner’s duty during rain. The law does not require perfect dryness or continuous mopping in the immediate entrance area during active precipitation.
Interior locations are different. Under Emory v. Smith, the protective doctrine applies primarily to entrance areas. Water deep inside a building, or in locations removed from entrances, requires action by the owner. The doctrine does not create blanket immunity for the entire building.
Current Georgia Law
The Rainy Day Doctrine is a common law principle derived from O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 (duty of ordinary care) and relates to O.C.G.A. § 51-11-7 (assumption of risk). Courts interpret these statutes to mean that owners need only exercise ordinary care, not prevent every possible consequence of weather.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can I sue if I slip at an entrance on a rainy day?
It is difficult but not impossible. If the store failed to place mats, failed to post warning signs, or if the water accumulation was unusual or excessive compared to what you would expect from normal tracked-in rain, you may have a case. Additionally, if you fell well beyond the entrance area where you would not expect water (Emory v. Smith), the Rainy Day Doctrine may not apply.
What if there were no “Wet Floor” signs?
This strengthens your case. While rain itself provides some notice under Hack-A-Way, property owners still have a duty to take reasonable precautions including warning signs. The absence of signs may indicate failure to exercise ordinary care, particularly if the water accumulation was significant.
Does the doctrine apply if the rain stopped hours before my fall?
No. The Rainy Day Doctrine applies during active precipitation and for a reasonable time afterward while floors are drying. If rain stopped hours before the fall and the floor remained wet, the owner should have had time to dry the area. The defense weakens significantly as time passes after the rain stops.
4. Static Defects and Trip Hazards: 3 Cases on Permanent Conditions
Unlike temporary hazards such as spills, “static defects” are permanent or semi-permanent conditions such as uneven pavement, cracks, potholes, raised thresholds, or broken steps. These cases are governed by different principles because the hazard is always present and theoretically discoverable through observation.
City of Brunswick v. Smith (250 Ga. App. 485, 2001)
A pedestrian tripped on a visible crack in a public sidewalk and sued the city. The crack had existed for years and the plaintiff had walked over it successfully on multiple prior occasions. The plaintiff claimed the crack was dangerous despite its visibility.
The Ruling: A “static condition” is one that does not change over time. Static defects that are open and obvious generally do not create liability because visitors can see and avoid them. If a defect is plainly visible and the plaintiff has successfully negotiated it on prior occasions, the plaintiff is presumed to have knowledge equal to the owner’s knowledge. Under the second prong of American Multi-Cinema, the plaintiff cannot claim lack of knowledge of a hazard they have previously encountered. The doctrine of “prior traversal” establishes that walking over a defect without injury proves you knew of its existence and accepted the risk. Unless something about the condition changed, or the plaintiff was distracted by conditions created by the owner, recovery is barred.
Cocklin v. JC Penney Corp. (296 Ga. App. 179, 2009)
A customer tripped on a metal threshold strip separating carpeted areas from tile flooring at a store entrance. The strip created a height differential of approximately one-half inch. The customer argued the strip was dangerous. The store argued the strip was visible and commonly used throughout the retail industry.
The Ruling: Small height differentials, often called “trivial defects,” do not necessarily constitute negligence. Many buildings have transitions between flooring types that create minor elevation changes. However, whether a defect is trivial is a question of fact for the jury considering factors including the height of the differential, the lighting conditions, and whether the defect is camouflaged. If lighting is poor or if the transition strip blends with the surrounding floor colors creating an “optical illusion” of a flat surface, a potentially trivial defect becomes a jury question. The camouflaging of a defect removes it from the “open and obvious” category because the defect, while technically visible, is not readily apparent to a person exercising ordinary care.
Nemeth v. R.C. Cola Bottling Co. (239 Ga. App. 527, 1999)
A delivery driver making regular deliveries to a facility tripped on a concrete loading dock ramp he had walked up and down multiple times per week for months. The driver argued the ramp was poorly designed with an excessive slope.
The Ruling: The doctrine of prior traversal bars recovery when a plaintiff has successfully negotiated a specific static defect on previous occasions. If you have walked over, around, or past a permanent condition multiple times without injury, the law conclusively presumes you knew the condition existed and understood its characteristics. You cannot later claim the hazard was unexpected or unknown. This principle applies even if the plaintiff “forgot” about the hazard between encounters. The knowledge is legally imputed to the plaintiff based on prior successful navigation. The only exceptions are if something about the condition changed between encounters, or if the plaintiff’s attention was diverted by actions of the property owner.
What These Cases Established
Open and obvious hazards. Under City of Brunswick, if a defect is plainly visible to a person exercising ordinary care, the owner has no duty to warn of it or remedy it. The visitor is expected to see and avoid obvious hazards.
Prior traversal creates legal knowledge. Under Nemeth, walking over a defect previously without injury proves you knew about it. This knowledge defeats the second prong of the American Multi-Cinema test. You cannot claim you didn’t know about something you previously encountered.
Camouflage removes “open and obvious” protection. Under Cocklin, if poor lighting or color matching causes a defect to blend into its surroundings, it may not be “open and obvious” despite being technically visible. The optical illusion created by camouflage presents a jury question about whether the plaintiff could have discovered the hazard through ordinary care.
Current Georgia Law
Static defect cases are governed primarily by O.C.G.A. § 51-11-7, which provides that where the plaintiff by ordinary care could have avoided the consequences to himself caused by the defendant’s negligence, he is not entitled to recover. This statute embodies the principle that obvious hazards do not create liability when the plaintiff could have seen and avoided them.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can I sue for tripping on a crack I could see?
Generally no. Under City of Brunswick, if the crack is open and obvious, meaning visible to someone exercising ordinary care, you are expected to avoid it. The owner’s duty is to keep premises safe, not to remove every minor imperfection from every surface.
What if the crack was very small?
“Trivial defects,” typically height differentials of less than one inch, often do not create liability unless aggravating factors exist such as poor lighting, camouflage, or distraction by the owner. Courts recognize that requiring property owners to maintain perfectly smooth surfaces would impose unreasonable burdens.
What if I walked there before but forgot about the defect?
Under Nemeth, forgetting is not a valid defense to prior traversal. The law presumes that if you successfully navigated the hazard before, you had knowledge of it, and that knowledge persists. The only exception would be if substantial time passed such that the defect could be considered newly encountered.
5. The Distraction Doctrine: 3 Cases That Excuse Not Looking Down
The Distraction Doctrine provides a critical exception to the general rule that people must watch where they walk. This doctrine recognizes that property owners, particularly retail establishments, deliberately design their premises to capture visitor attention through displays, signs, and merchandise arrangements. When that deliberate distraction prevents a visitor from seeing a hazard, the owner cannot escape liability by claiming the visitor should have been looking down.
Barentine v. Kroger Co. (264 Ga. 224, 1994)
A customer fell while walking toward a checkout register, looking at the cashier and checkout area rather than at the floor. Kroger argued the customer’s failure to look at the floor constituted contributory negligence barring recovery.
The Ruling: The distraction must arise from the owner’s business operations or from a sudden emergency beyond the plaintiff’s control. Distractions inherent in the shopping experience, such as looking at cashiers, scanning for available checkout lanes, watching for other shoppers, or reading store signs, are natural and expected. Property owners benefit from these distractions because they facilitate commerce. Therefore, attention diverted by legitimate business operations excuses the failure to maintain constant floor surveillance. However, “self-induced” distractions, such as using a cell phone for personal calls, reading personal messages, or engaging in non-business-related conversations that cause inattention, do not excuse failing to look where one is walking. The distraction must be connected to the owner’s business interests to invoke the doctrine’s protection.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Chandler (152 Ga. App. 427, 1979)
A customer was walking down an aisle while looking at merchandise displays intentionally positioned to attract shopper attention. The customer tripped over a hazard on the floor. Sears argued the customer should have been watching the floor rather than looking at merchandise.
The Ruling: The Distraction Doctrine applies when a plaintiff’s attention is diverted by natural and usual causes inherent in the business operations, particularly when the owner deliberately created the distraction. Retail stores arrange merchandise displays, colorful signs, and eye-catching presentations specifically to attract customer attention. These displays serve the owner’s commercial interests by encouraging examination of products and impulse purchases. Property owners cannot simultaneously benefit from deliberate attention-capturing designs while disclaiming responsibility for hazards customers fail to see while their attention is diverted by those very designs. The doctrine recognizes that requiring customers to constantly look downward while shopping would defeat the purpose of retail displays and make shopping impossible.
Food Lion, Inc. v. Isaac (272 Ga. App. 311, 2005)
A customer tripped over a merchandise pallet left in an aisle while the customer was reading a sale sign posted above eye level. The customer offered evidence that the sale sign was intentionally placed to attract shopper attention.
The Ruling: If the plaintiff presents evidence that their attention was diverted by store displays, signs, or other business-related stimuli, this creates a jury question regarding whether the plaintiff exercised ordinary care. The jury must determine whether the distraction was reasonable given the circumstances. However, if the plaintiff creates their own impediment to observation, such as carrying a large box that blocks downward vision, or voluntarily engaging in activities unrelated to the store’s business, the Distraction Doctrine does not apply. The key distinction is whether the owner benefited from the distraction or created conditions that diverted attention.
What These Cases Established
Store-created distractions are valid defenses. Under Chandler, when stores deliberately design displays and signs to capture attention, they assume responsibility for hazards shoppers fail to see while their attention is diverted by those business-serving displays.
Business-related focus excuses floor observation. Under Barentine, looking for checkout lanes, watching cashiers, scanning for store employees, or reading directional signs are legitimate activities that excuse constant floor surveillance. These activities serve the store’s interests.
Self-induced distractions provide no protection. Personal cell phone use, daydreaming, or other non-business-related inattention does not invoke the Distraction Doctrine. The distraction must benefit the property owner’s business to shift responsibility.
Current Georgia Law
The Distraction Doctrine is a judicial interpretation and application of O.C.G.A. § 51-11-7 (avoidance of consequences). While that statute generally requires plaintiffs to avoid hazards they could discover through ordinary care, the Distraction Doctrine modifies this duty by recognizing that store-created distractions reduce the plaintiff’s ability to discover floor hazards despite exercising ordinary care.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does looking for a product on shelves count as a valid distraction?
Yes. Under Chandler, scanning shelves for specific products is exactly what the store intends customers to do. You are not required to alternate between looking at shelves and looking at the floor. The store’s business model relies on customers examining merchandise, and this creates valid distraction.
What if I was using my cell phone when I fell?
Personal cell phone use is a self-induced distraction. Under Barentine, the store did not create this distraction and does not benefit from it. Using your phone for personal reasons while shopping will likely be deemed contributory negligence that bars or reduces recovery. However, if you were using the store’s mobile app to find products or check prices, this might qualify as business-related.
Does the distraction have to be visual?
Typically yes, but not exclusively. Loud announcements, PA systems, or sudden noises that cause you to look up or turn your attention away from the floor can also qualify. However, merely “thinking about something else” or being mentally distracted does not invoke the doctrine.
6. Inadequate Security and Third-Party Crimes: 3 Cases on Criminal Acts
Property owners can be held liable when guests are assaulted, robbed, raped, or murdered on their premises, but only under specific circumstances. This specialized area of premises liability turns on whether the criminal act was “foreseeable” based on prior criminal activity at the location. These are often the highest-value premises cases because injuries from violent crime tend to be catastrophic.
Sturbridge Partners, Ltd. v. Walker (267 Ga. 785, 1997)
A tenant was violently assaulted in the parking lot of an apartment complex. The apartment complex had a documented history of property crimes including car break-ins and thefts but no prior violent assaults. The complex argued that prior property crimes did not make violent assault foreseeable and therefore created no duty to provide security.
The Ruling: To establish liability for third-party criminal acts, the plaintiff must prove the crime was foreseeable based on prior similar criminal activity on or near the premises. The court ruled that prior crimes must be “substantially similar” to the crime that occurred to establish foreseeability, but they need not be identical. Critically, the court held that a pattern of property crimes can make violent crimes foreseeable because both stem from inadequate security and demonstrate a general breakdown of safety. Prior burglaries, car break-ins, and thefts suggest a property attracts criminal activity, which can escalate to violence. The plaintiff must typically present police reports, incident logs, or other documentary evidence of prior crimes to establish a pattern. Once foreseeability is established, the owner has a duty to take reasonable security measures such as improved lighting, security patrols, gates, or surveillance cameras.
Days Inns of America v. Matt (265 Ga. 235, 1995)
A hotel guest was shot and seriously injured during an armed robbery in the hotel parking lot. The hotel had a documented history of prior robberies and assaults at the property but provided no security guards, inadequate lighting, and no functioning security cameras despite representations that security cameras were operational.
The Ruling: While a property owner is not an insurer of guest safety and cannot prevent all crime, if the owner knows of a pattern of prior criminal activity on the premises and fails to take reasonable steps to deter such activity, the owner can be held liable when foreseeable crimes occur. Reasonable security measures must be proportional to the known risk. If prior violent crimes occurred at the property, merely posting signs warning guests to lock their doors is insufficient. The owner must implement meaningful security such as guards, functional lighting, working surveillance systems, or access controls. Fraudulently representing that security measures exist when they do not (such as fake cameras) can support punitive damages. The duty is to take reasonable precautions, not to guarantee safety.
Six Flags Over Georgia II, L.P. v. Martin (335 Ga. App. 350, 2015)
A patron leaving Six Flags theme park was attacked and injured at a MARTA bus stop located just outside the park’s property line on public property. Six Flags argued it had no duty to protect patrons from crimes occurring off its property.
The Ruling: Property owner liability can extend beyond strict legal property boundaries when the owner uses adjacent areas for its business operations and knows those areas present dangers to patrons. If a business knows its customers must traverse certain public areas to access the premises, and if the business knows those areas present criminal dangers, the business has a duty to warn or to take reasonable steps to protect patrons. This landmark case established that businesses cannot turn a blind eye to dangers lurking in approach areas their customers must use. The duty arises from the owner’s knowledge of the danger and the fact that customers must use the dangerous area to access the business. Property owners cannot escape liability by intentionally locating their entrances adjacent to known high-crime public areas without warning customers or providing security.
What These Cases Established
Foreseeability is the key. Under Sturbridge, if crimes happened before, the owner should reasonably anticipate they will happen again. Prior criminal activity puts the owner on notice of the need for security measures.
Substantial similarity, not identical crimes. Under Sturbridge, prior property crimes can make violent crimes foreseeable because all crime stems from inadequate security. The crimes need not be identical to establish a pattern.
Duty to implement security. Under Days Inns, once a pattern of crime is established, merely warning guests is insufficient. The owner must take affirmative steps such as hiring guards, fixing lights, installing functioning cameras, or implementing access controls.
Approach areas matter. Under Six Flags, liability can extend to areas just beyond property lines if the owner knows customers must use those areas and knows the areas are dangerous.
Current Georgia Law
O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 establishes the general duty of property owners to exercise ordinary care to keep premises safe, which courts have interpreted to include protection from foreseeable third-party criminal acts. The duty exists when the owner knows or should know of the danger.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can I sue if I was robbed in a parking lot?
Yes, if there was prior criminal activity at that location. Under Sturbridge, you need police reports or incident logs documenting prior crimes at the property to establish foreseeability. Your attorney will submit Open Records Requests to obtain police reports showing calls to that address.
Do prior crimes have to be identical to the crime I suffered?
No. Under Sturbridge, “substantial similarity” is required, not identical crimes. A history of car break-ins can make robbery or assault foreseeable because all indicate a general security problem at the property.
What if the property owner hired security guards but they weren’t present?
This strengthens your case significantly. If the owner voluntarily undertook security measures (hiring guards) but implemented them negligently (understaffing, poor training, guards sleeping or absent), the owner can be held liable. Courts recognize that undertaking security creates a duty to perform it competently.
7. Lighting and Visibility: 3 Cases on Darkness and Inadequate Illumination
Adequate lighting is a fundamental component of premises safety. However, Georgia courts draw important distinctions between total darkness, which serves as its own warning, and dim lighting that creates optical illusions. The analysis differs for landlord-tenant relationships versus business invitees.
Cadin v. Hill (262 Ga. App. 514, 2003)
A person fell down stairs in an area that was completely unlit. The plaintiff was unfamiliar with the property and could not see the stairs due to total darkness. The plaintiff argued the owner had a duty to provide lighting or warn of the danger.
The Ruling: Generally, total darkness constitutes an “open and obvious” hazard in itself. A reasonable person confronted with complete darkness should not proceed into the unknown. Total darkness serves as a warning that danger may lie ahead. If you cannot see where you are going, ordinary care requires you to stop, wait for your eyes to adjust, find a light source, or retreat. A person who voluntarily walks into total darkness in an unfamiliar area assumes the risk of falling. The darkness itself puts the visitor on notice that the path ahead is dangerous. However, this principle does not apply when the visitor has no alternative route (such as a tenant accessing their only exit) or when the owner has a specific statutory duty to provide lighting (such as in common areas of rental housing).
Sumbry v. Land (127 Ga. App. 486, 1972)
A tenant fell in a common hallway of an apartment building when the light fixture was inoperative. The landlord had been notified that the bulb was burned out but failed to replace it for several days. The tenant used the hallway as the only means of accessing their apartment.
The Ruling: Landlords have a statutory duty under Georgia law to keep rental premises in repair, which includes maintaining functional lighting in common areas such as hallways, stairwells, and entrances. Unlike business invitees who might avoid dark areas, tenants have no choice but to use building hallways and stairs to access their homes. Therefore, tenants do not assume the risk of darkness in common areas even if they know the lighting is inadequate. If the landlord has notice that lighting is non-functional and fails to repair it within a reasonable time, the landlord is liable for falls resulting from the darkness. Notice can come from tenant complaints, inspection by the landlord, or the passage of sufficient time that the landlord should have discovered the problem through reasonable inspection.
Pylant v. VFW (250 Ga. App. 529, 2001)
A person fell on a step that was obscured by inadequate lighting. The lighting was dim rather than completely absent, creating shadows that concealed the step’s edge. The plaintiff was unfamiliar with the area and did not see the step down.
The Ruling: Dim lighting that is insufficient to reveal hazards creates a different analysis than total darkness. If lighting is inadequate to allow a visitor exercising ordinary care to see and avoid hazards, and if the visitor is not familiar with the premises, whether the owner was negligent becomes a jury question. Dim lighting that creates optical illusions or obscures depth perception is particularly dangerous because it deceives visitors into believing surfaces are flat when they are not. Unlike total darkness which serves as a warning, dim lighting provides false confidence that the area is safe. If the lighting makes it appear that a floor is level when there is actually a step down, the owner may be liable for creating a deceptive condition. Familiarity matters; if the plaintiff knew about the step from prior visits, even dim lighting may not create liability.
What These Cases Established
Total darkness versus dim lighting. Under Cadin, walking into total darkness is generally the plaintiff’s fault because darkness itself is a warning. However, under Pylant, dim lighting that deceives the eye creates liability because it provides false security.
Landlord duty to repair. Under Sumbry, landlords must maintain functional lighting in common areas of rental housing. Tenants do not assume the risk of darkness when accessing their homes.
Optical illusions. Under Pylant, lighting that creates the appearance of safety while obscuring hazards is more dangerous than no lighting at all because it deceives visitors.
Current Georgia Law
O.C.G.A. § 44-7-13 imposes on landlords a duty to keep rental premises in repair, which courts have interpreted to include maintaining functional lighting fixtures in common areas.
O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 establishes the general duty of property owners to maintain premises in reasonably safe condition, which includes providing adequate lighting where business invitees are expected.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is a burned-out light bulb negligence?
For landlords, yes. Under Sumbry, failure to replace bulbs in common areas of rental properties violates the statutory duty to repair. For businesses, a single burned-out bulb among many functioning lights may not be negligent, but if the lighting is generally inadequate, the owner may be liable.
Can I sue if I fell at night in a parking lot?
It depends. If the lights were functioning and it was simply nighttime, generally no; you are expected to exercise care in darkness. However, if the parking lot lights were broken, inadequate for the area, or non-existent when customers would reasonably expect lighting, the owner may be liable under Pylant.
What if I knew the area was dark?
Under Cadin, if you were familiar with the property and knew the lighting was inadequate, you may have assumed the risk by choosing to proceed. However, under Sumbry, if you are a tenant with no alternative route, knowledge of darkness does not bar recovery because you have no choice but to use the area.
8. Spoliation of Evidence: 3 Cases on Destroyed Surveillance Video
In modern premises liability litigation, surveillance video footage is frequently the most critical evidence. Video can show how long a hazard existed, whether employees were nearby, what warnings existed, and whether the plaintiff was distracted or exercising ordinary care. When property owners fail to preserve video evidence after receiving notice of an incident, courts impose serious sanctions under the doctrine of “spoliation of evidence.”
Kroger Co. v. Walters (319 Ga. App. 52, 2012)
A customer fell in a Kroger store and immediately reported the fall to management. A manager reviewed the surveillance video showing the fall but failed to save the footage. The store’s video system automatically overwrote the footage after several days, and the video was lost. At trial, Kroger argued it should not be sanctioned because the failure to preserve the video was inadvertent rather than intentional.
The Ruling: Once a party knows or reasonably should know that evidence is relevant to pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation, that party has a duty to preserve the evidence. Failure to preserve evidence, even if inadvertent rather than intentional, can result in sanctions including adverse jury instructions. The court can instruct the jury to presume that destroyed evidence would have been unfavorable to the party who destroyed it. This presumption can be outcome-determinative. In premises cases, when video is destroyed, juries may be instructed to presume the video would have shown the hazard existed for a substantial time, that employees were nearby, or that the plaintiff was exercising reasonable care. The duty to preserve arises when litigation is reasonably foreseeable, which occurs when a serious injury is reported to management or when an attorney sends a preservation letter.
Walmart Stores, Inc. v. Lee (348 Ga. App. 704, 2019)
A slip and fall incident occurred at Walmart. The plaintiff’s attorney sent a spoliation letter to Walmart three days after the incident, specifically demanding preservation of video footage, inspection logs, and incident reports. Despite this letter, Walmart allowed its surveillance system to overwrite the relevant footage. At trial, Walmart argued it had no duty to preserve evidence before a lawsuit was formally filed.
The Ruling: The duty to preserve evidence arises when litigation is reasonably foreseeable, not merely when a lawsuit is filed. A serious injury reported to management, a customer’s request to review video, or a demand letter from an attorney all trigger the duty to preserve relevant evidence. Property owners cannot wait until formal service of a complaint to begin preserving evidence. Many businesses have internal policies requiring video preservation when incidents are reported; violation of these policies can establish the duty and demonstrate bad faith. The fact that video exists is not enough; it must be preserved. Arguments that preservation was “inconvenient” or “burdensome” are rejected when the owner knew the evidence was relevant.
Baxley v. Hakiel Industries (282 Ga. 312, 2007)
A premises liability case involving the general principles of spoliation sanctions.
The Ruling: When evidence is destroyed, courts have broad discretion to impose sanctions proportional to the severity of the spoliation and the prejudice to the opposing party. Sanctions can range from adverse jury instructions (presuming the evidence was unfavorable) to striking pleadings or entering judgment against the spoliator. The most common sanction in premises cases is the adverse inference instruction, which tells the jury they may presume the destroyed video would have proven the plaintiff’s case. This presumption, combined with the plaintiff’s other evidence, is often sufficient to reach a jury verdict for the plaintiff. The court’s goal is to restore the evidentiary balance by placing the plaintiff in the position they would have been in had the evidence been preserved.
What These Cases Established
Preserve immediately upon notice. Under Kroger v. Walters, once management knows of a serious incident, video must be preserved. Allowing automatic overwriting after receiving notice of injury creates liability for spoliation.
Notice triggers the duty. Under Walmart v. Lee, you don’t need to wait for a lawsuit. Injury reports, attorney demand letters, or requests to view video all trigger the preservation duty.
Adverse inference is powerful. Under Baxley, courts instruct juries to presume destroyed evidence would have been unfavorable to the party that destroyed it. This presumption can win cases that might otherwise fail.
Current Georgia Law
O.C.G.A. § 24-14-22 codifies the common law rule that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse to the party suppressing it. While this statute requires “willfulness,” Georgia courts apply it liberally in spoliation cases, finding willfulness when parties knew of the duty to preserve but failed to act.
Frequently Asked Questions
How do I prevent the store from deleting surveillance video?
Your attorney should immediately send a spoliation letter (also called a preservation letter or litigation hold letter) to the property owner by certified mail, email, and fax. This letter specifically identifies the incident, demands preservation of all video footage, inspection logs, incident reports, employee statements, and any other relevant evidence. The letter triggers the legal duty to preserve.
What if the store says the cameras weren’t working?
This happens frequently and is often suspicious. If the store claims cameras were non-functional, your attorney will investigate whether other footage from the same cameras exists from before or after the incident. If the store can produce video from the same cameras at other times, the claim that cameras weren’t working becomes questionable. Additionally, if the store had a duty to maintain functioning cameras (such as in high-crime areas), non-functioning cameras may itself be evidence of negligence.
What sanctions can courts impose for spoliation?
The most common sanction is an adverse inference instruction telling the jury to presume the missing video would have proven the plaintiff’s case. More severe sanctions include striking the defendant’s answer (entering judgment for the plaintiff) or prohibiting the defendant from presenting certain defenses. The severity depends on whether the spoliation was intentional or negligent and the degree of prejudice to the plaintiff.
9. Landlord and Tenant Liability: 3 Cases on Rental Property Duties
Landlord-tenant relationships create specific duties that differ from general business-invitee relationships. Georgia statutory law imposes on landlords a non-delegable duty to keep rental premises in repair, which cannot be waived by contract. These protections apply primarily to tenants, not to social guests of tenants.
Sparks v. Metropolitan Asset Committee (286 Ga. App. 420, 2007)
A tenant was injured by a defective condition in a rental apartment, specifically, a broken handrail on stairs leading to the apartment entrance. The tenant sued the landlord for failing to maintain the premises in safe condition. The landlord argued the tenant never reported the broken handrail and therefore the landlord had no notice of the defect.
The Ruling: Under O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14, landlords are liable for damages resulting from failure to keep premises in repair. However, the landlord must have notice, actual or constructive, of the defect and a reasonable opportunity to repair it before liability attaches. Actual notice occurs when the tenant specifically informs the landlord of the problem through oral or written communication. Constructive notice exists if the defect existed for sufficient time that the landlord should have discovered it through reasonable inspection, or if the landlord inspected the unit and should have observed the defect. Unlike business premises where visitors are temporary, landlords have an ongoing relationship with tenants that allows tenants to report problems and landlords to conduct periodic inspections. The notice requirement ensures landlords have opportunity to address problems before liability arises.
Thompson v. Crownover (259 Ga. 126, 1989)
A tenant was injured by a gas heater in a rental unit that was known to be defective and dangerous. The landlord knew the heater was malfunctioning but had not repaired it. The lease contained an “as-is” clause stating the tenant accepted the property in its current condition and waived the landlord’s duty to make any repairs. The landlord argued this contractual provision eliminated liability.
The Ruling: The landlord’s statutory duty to keep premises in repair under O.C.G.A. § 44-7-13 is a non-delegable duty that cannot be waived or contracted away. Even if a lease contains an “as-is” clause or a provision making the tenant responsible for repairs, these contractual terms cannot relieve the landlord of liability for code violations, dangerous defects affecting habitability, or known hazardous conditions. Public policy requires that rental housing meet minimum safety standards regardless of what the lease says. Contractual provisions attempting to waive landlord responsibility are void and unenforceable when they concern conditions that threaten tenant safety or violate building codes. This rule prevents landlords from using unequal bargaining power to avoid safety responsibilities.
Country Club Apartments v. Scott (246 Ga. 443, 1980)
A tenant’s guest was injured by a defect in the apartment. The guest sued the landlord, arguing the landlord owed a duty of care to all persons lawfully on the premises, including social guests of tenants.
The Ruling: The landlord’s statutory duty under O.C.G.A. § 44-7-13 runs primarily to the tenant, not to the tenant’s guests. While landlords have some duty to keep common areas safe for all lawful visitors, the landlord is generally not liable to third parties for dangerous conditions within the tenant’s exclusive possession and control (such as inside the apartment unit itself) unless the landlord retained control over that area or knew of illegal or dangerous uses by the tenant. The tenant, as occupier of the apartment, has primary responsibility for the safety of their own guests while inside the apartment. However, landlords remain responsible for structural defects, code violations, and conditions in common areas (hallways, stairs, parking lots) even as to the tenant’s guests.
What These Cases Established
Notice is required for landlord liability. Under Sparks, tenants must report defects to landlords, or the defect must exist long enough that reasonable inspection would discover it. Landlords are not liable for unknown problems.
“As-is” clauses are void for safety defects. Under Thompson, landlords cannot use contract provisions to escape responsibility for dangerous conditions. The statutory duty to repair overrides contrary lease language.
Duty runs to tenant, not always to guests. Under Country Club Apartments, the landlord’s primary duty is to the tenant. Guests may have limited rights depending on where the injury occurred (common area versus inside the unit).
Current Georgia Law
O.C.G.A. § 44-7-13: Requires landlords to keep premises in repair during the tenancy. This is a mandatory duty.
O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14: Makes landlords liable for damages resulting from defective construction or failure to keep premises in repair, provided the landlord has notice.
O.C.G.A. § 44-7-20: Requires landlords to maintain rental property in compliance with building and housing codes.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can I sue my landlord if I knew about the defect?
Yes, unlike the typical premises liability rule. Under Thompson, even if you knew about a dangerous condition, the landlord remains liable if they had notice and failed to repair it. Tenants cannot simply “avoid” defects in their own homes the way store customers can avoid aisles.
Does a text message to the landlord count as notice?
Yes. Notice can be oral or written, formal or informal. Text messages, emails, phone calls, or in-person conversations all constitute notice. For proof purposes, written notice (text, email) is preferable because it creates documentation.
What if my lease says I’m responsible for all repairs?
Under Thompson, this provision is unenforceable for dangerous defects or code violations. While you might be responsible for minor maintenance (changing light bulbs, furnace filters), the landlord cannot shift responsibility for structural defects, hazardous conditions, or code violations onto tenants through lease language.
10. The Open and Obvious Doctrine: 3 Cases That Define Visible Hazards
The “Open and Obvious Doctrine” represents the most common defense to premises liability claims. This doctrine holds that property owners have no duty to warn of or remedy hazards that are plainly visible to visitors exercising ordinary care. If you could see it, you should have avoided it.
Bartenfeld v. Chick-fil-A, Inc. (346 Ga. App. 759, 2018)
A customer tripped over a concrete curb in a Chick-fil-A parking lot while walking to her vehicle after ordering food. The curb was painted bright yellow, it was mid-afternoon on a clear sunny day, and the curb separated the parking spaces from a landscaped area. The customer argued the curb placement was dangerous and created a tripping hazard. Chick-fil-A argued the yellow-painted curb was open and obvious.
The Ruling: The curb was an open and obvious static condition that created no duty on the part of the property owner to warn or remedy. The court held that the curb was conspicuous: it was painted bright yellow for visibility, it was in broad daylight, and it served the obvious function of separating parking areas from landscaping. A person exercising ordinary care and looking where they were walking would see the curb and avoid it. The court emphasized that property owners have no duty to warn of hazards that are plainly visible and apparent to visitors. The fact that the plaintiff tripped despite the curb being obvious demonstrated her failure to exercise ordinary care, not any negligence on the part of the property owner. Even if the curb could be considered poorly designed or unnecessarily placed, the question is not whether the owner should have placed it there but whether a reasonable person would see it.
LeCroy v. Bragg (156 Ga. App. 417, 1980)
A plaintiff fell on a condition they had previously encountered and successfully navigated on prior visits to the property. The plaintiff claimed the condition was dangerous despite having walked past it before without injury.
The Ruling: When a person has successfully negotiated a dangerous condition on a previous occasion, that person is conclusively presumed to have knowledge of its existence and nature. This “prior successful traversal” creates legal knowledge equal to the owner’s knowledge. Under the second prong of the American Multi-Cinema test, if you have knowledge equal to the owner’s knowledge, you cannot satisfy the requirement that you lacked knowledge despite ordinary care. This principle prevents plaintiffs from claiming surprise at conditions they previously encountered. The logic is that successful prior navigation proves you saw the hazard, understood its characteristics, and knew how to avoid it. Forgetting between visits is not a valid excuse; the law imputes the knowledge to you based on the prior encounter.
Freyer v. Silver (234 Ga. App. 243, 1998)
A pedestrian fell into a catch basin (storm drain inlet) that was at ground level and visible. The catch basin’s grate was missing, leaving an open hole. The plaintiff argued the property owner should have filled or covered the hole.
The Ruling: There is no duty to warn of conditions that are just as obvious to the visitor as they are to the owner. The “equal knowledge” rule bars recovery when both parties have equivalent information about the hazard. If you know what the owner knows, the owner has no “superior knowledge,” which defeats the first prong of the American Multi-Cinema test. The premises liability rule is based on the concept that owners should warn of hidden dangers that they know about but visitors do not. When the danger is equally apparent to both parties, the basis for liability disappears. This principle applies even to serious hazards; the issue is not severity but visibility.
What These Cases Established
Plain sight defeats liability. Under Bartenfeld, large, conspicuous hazards such as yellow-painted curbs in broad daylight are considered obvious. Property owners need not warn of what visitors can plainly see with ordinary observation.
Prior traversal creates conclusive knowledge. Under LeCroy, if you walked there before without injury, you legally knew about the condition. This knowledge persists and defeats claims of surprise at subsequent encounters.
Equal knowledge bars recovery. Under Freyer, when you know as much as the owner knows about a hazard, there is no basis for liability. The superior knowledge requirement is not met.
Current Georgia Law
The Open and Obvious Doctrine is codified in O.C.G.A. § 51-11-7, which provides that if the plaintiff by ordinary care could have avoided the consequences of the defendant’s negligence, the plaintiff cannot recover. Courts interpret this to mean that obvious hazards do not create liability because visitors exercising ordinary care would see and avoid them.
Frequently Asked Questions
What makes a hazard “open and obvious”?
Size, color contrast, lighting, and location all matter. A large yellow-painted curb in broad daylight is obvious, as in Bartenfeld. A gray step on a gray floor in dim lighting might not be. If the hazard is camouflaged, blends with surroundings, or is obscured by poor lighting, it may not be obvious despite being technically visible.
Can the Distraction Doctrine override “open and obvious”?
Yes, potentially. Under the Distraction Doctrine, if the store deliberately distracted your attention away from an otherwise visible hazard, you may recover despite the hazard being technically obvious. The store cannot simultaneously demand your attention upward (displays) and downward (floor) at the same time.
What if I saw the hazard but misjudged it?
This creates a difficult situation. If you saw the hazard but underestimated its danger (such as seeing a wet floor but not realizing how slippery it was), you may still have an argument that the hazard was not truly “open and obvious” because its danger was not apparent. However, courts often find that seeing the hazard creates knowledge, even if you misjudged its severity.
Conclusion: Strategic Framework for Premises Liability Cases
Georgia premises liability law operates on a deceptively simple principle: property owners must know more about dangers than their visitors. This “superior knowledge” framework creates a legal battlefield where evidence of what each party knew and when they knew it determines victory or defeat.
For Injured Parties:
You don’t forfeit rights by not staring at your feet. Under Robinson v. Kroger, the law recognizes that shoppers naturally look at merchandise, signs, and other people. You are not required to maintain constant downward surveillance.
Evidence is everything. Without surveillance video showing how long a hazard existed (Kroger v. Walters), without inspection logs showing the store failed to check the area (Kroger v. Brooks), or without witnesses placing employees near the hazard (Food Lion v. Walker), these cases are difficult to prove. Demand video preservation immediately.
The Distraction Doctrine is your best friend. If you were looking at store displays, reading signs, or scanning for products when you fell, you have a valid defense to claims you should have been watching the floor. The store benefits from these distractions, so they bear the risk.
Constructive knowledge has limits. Unless you can prove either that employees were nearby or that the hazard existed long enough to be discovered, you cannot meet the first prong of the American Multi-Cinema test. Look for circumstantial evidence of duration: dried edges on liquids, footprints through debris, shopping cart tracks.
“Open and obvious” is not always a winner for defendants. Camouflage (Cocklin), poor lighting (Pylant), and distraction (Chandler) can defeat the open and obvious defense even for visible hazards.
For Property Owners:
Document everything. Inspection logs that are specific, contemporaneous, and credible can defeat constructive knowledge claims (Kroger v. Brooks). Vague testimony about “routine” inspections without documentation is insufficient.
Preserve evidence immediately. When an incident is reported, preserve all surveillance video, inspection logs, incident reports, and witness statements. Failure to preserve creates devastating presumptions against you (Kroger v. Walters).
Take security seriously. If your property has a history of crime, you must implement meaningful security measures proportional to the known risk (Days Inns v. Matt). Police reports from nearby properties or similar businesses can establish foreseeability.
For All Parties:
Most cases settle. Premises liability cases that survive summary judgment typically settle before trial because juries are unpredictable and damages can be substantial. The key battles occur at the summary judgment stage where the American Multi-Cinema two-prong test determines whether the case proceeds.
Foreseeability determines negligence. Whether discussing criminal acts (Sturbridge), rainy day falls (Walker v. Sears), or static defects (City of Brunswick), Georgia courts analyze what the owner should have reasonably anticipated and what steps ordinary care required.
These are not “easy money” cases. Despite the public perception of premises liability as “slip and fall” lawsuits, Georgia law creates substantial barriers to recovery. Property owners are not insurers, and plaintiffs bear significant burdens of proof.
This guide uses verified Georgia statutes and appellate court decisions current as of 2025. Premises liability law continues to evolve, particularly in areas involving security, surveillance technology, and landlord duties. If you have been injured on someone else’s property in Georgia, consult with a licensed attorney who can evaluate how these principles apply to your specific circumstances.
Disclaimer: This content is for educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Sources:
Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.), Title 51 (Torts) and Title 44 (Property), available through the Georgia General Assembly website.
Georgia Supreme Court and Court of Appeals opinions, available through Westlaw, LexisNexis, and Google Scholar.