Georgia Dram Shop Case Law: 30 Court Decisions on Liability for Serving Alcohol

Georgia’s dram shop statute, OCGA § 51-1-40, starts from a legislative finding that “the consumption of alcoholic beverages, rather than the sale or furnishing or serving of such beverages, is the proximate cause” of injuries an intoxicated person inflicts. It then allows liability in two narrow situations: when someone “willfully, knowingly, and unlawfully” provides alcohol to a person under 21, or “knowingly” provides it to a person “in a state of noticeable intoxication,” and in either case knows that the person “will soon be driving a motor vehicle.” For an adult drinker, the Court of Appeals has broken the claim into three elements: knowingly serving a person in a state of noticeable intoxication, knowing that the person will soon be driving, and proximate cause (No. 14); when the person served is under 21, the noticeable-intoxication element does not apply. The Court of Appeals of Georgia has noted that the General Assembly enacted the statute in 1988. The 30 appellate decisions below show how Georgia courts have applied it to bars, restaurants, convenience stores, an airline, a fraternity, an employer and people hosting parties at home.

The Court of Appeals has called the statute a “broad insulation” of providers from liability, and the decisions reflect it. Of the 30, by this page’s count, 20 favored the person or business that provided the alcohol, 9 favored the injured plaintiff on the question decided, and one went partly each way. Seven are decisions of the Supreme Court of Georgia and 23 of the Court of Appeals. Many of the rulings for plaintiffs held only that the evidence raised a question for a jury; they did not decide that the provider was liable. Links go to each opinion’s text, either the Caselaw Access Project’s reporter version or a court PDF archived by CourtListener.

Section 51-1-40 Today

Every quotation of OCGA § 51-1-40 on this page, and of §§ 51-1-18 (a), 51-12-5.1 (f) and 51-12-33 (d), which some of the decisions apply, agrees with FindLaw’s text current as of March 28, 2024. None of the Office of Legislative Counsel’s summaries of general statutes enacted in 2024, 2025 and 2026 lists an amendment of § 51-1-40. One change bears on No. 23 below: according to the 2025 summary, 2025 SB 68 (Act 9) established a negligent security cause of action, OCGA §§ 51-3-50 through 51-3-57, whose provisions apply only to causes of action arising on or after April 21, 2025. No. 23, a claim against a bar for an injury in a fight between other patrons, was decided under the earlier law.

The Statute and Who Counts as a Provider

The first seven decisions address the statute’s validity and its reach: what “knowingly” requires, whether a seller can be liable for alcohol that reached the driver through someone else, and whether the statute applies to an airline, to a store selling sealed beer, and to a person who owned the land where others drank.

1. Riley v. H & H Operations (1993)

Riley v. H & H Operations, 263 Ga. 652, Supreme Court of Georgia, decided December 3, 1993

According to his deposition, Gary McQuithy, a minor, drove to a convenience store owned by H & H Operations at about 7:30 p.m. on September 24, 1988, bought a six-pack of beer without being asked for identification, and drove away. He drank about three and a half cans before midnight, and later that night, driving under the influence, he caused a crash that severely injured Terry Riley. The trial court read the statute to require actual knowledge that the buyer was a minor and would be driving imminently, upheld it as constitutional on that reading, and granted summary judgment to the store.

The Supreme Court upheld the statute but rejected the narrow reading of “knowingly.” “If one in the exercise of reasonable care should have known that the recipient of the alcohol was a minor and would be driving soon, he or she will be deemed to have knowledge of that fact,” the Court held, pointing to the statute’s provision that reliance on identification is rebuttable proof of lawful sale: “If the Act required actual knowledge, such a defense would be unnecessary.” McQuithy’s testimony was enough to defeat summary judgment, which was reversed, and two Court of Appeals decisions were disapproved to the extent they indicated a contrary result. Three justices dissented from that part of the decision.

2. Taylor v. N. I. L., Inc. (1996)

Taylor v. N. I. L., Inc., 221 Ga. App. 99, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided April 3, 1996

Ronald Steed and a friend, both under 21, bought a case and a half of beer at a package store run by N. I. L., Inc. without showing identification. Later that day David Telenko, who was 20, drank some of that beer at a friend’s house, along with three beers from another store and some rum, and the car Telenko was assumed to be driving crashed into a utility pole, killing Steed. Steed’s estate and parents sued the package store, and the trial court granted it summary judgment.

A sale to one underage buyer did not make the store liable for what another underage person later drank. Telenko was not present at the purchase, and “there is no evidence that, when NIL sold the beer to Steed and his friend, it sold or furnished beer to Telenko knowing he was a person not of legal drinking age and knowing he would soon be driving a motor vehicle.” The court allowed that a seller might furnish alcohol “by indirect means” in some circumstances, but “this is not such a case.” Evidence that Telenko might have bought the rum there was “pure speculation,” and the judgment was affirmed.

3. Kappa Sigma International Fraternity v. Tootle (1996)

Kappa Sigma International Fraternity v. Tootle, 221 Ga. App. 890, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided June 27, 1996

Clinton Fair, a 21-year-old guest who was not a member, attended a fraternity luau at a farm attended by 150 to 200 people, bringing beer he and friends had bought beforehand. Fair testified that he drank only his own beer, and fraternity officers stated that all the alcohol at the party was brought by members and guests. After his girlfriend drove him home, Fair was driving around town later that day when he was in a crash that killed Ernest Tootle. The plaintiff, Sonya Tootle, pointed to a member’s cooler of alcoholic punch and a keg that anyone could use, and the trial court denied the fraternity summary judgment.

Sitting as a full court, the Court of Appeals reversed. Circumstantial evidence offered against direct testimony “must be inconsistent with the defendant’s evidence, or if consistent, it must demand a finding of fact,” and evidence that members served other guests did not contradict the testimony that the fraternity provided nothing to Fair: “There is simply no evidence disputing Fair’s own testimony that he did not consume any alcohol provided by the Fraternity.” One judge dissented.

4. Pass v. Bouwsma (1999)

Pass v. Bouwsma, 239 Ga. App. 902, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided September 10, 1999

On January 5, 1996, Don Kent Glenn arrived at Michelle Bouwsma’s home drinking a beer he had brought, and the two spent the evening together, riding in his truck to a hamburger restaurant and then a bar. Glenn bought the beer and drinks along the way. Driving home while Bouwsma slept, he ran off the road, crossed the centerline and struck a car in which Alethea Michelle Pass, seven months pregnant, was a passenger; she and the unborn child died. Pass’s administrator sued Bouwsma for the death of the unborn child, and Bouwsma’s affidavit stated that she never provided Glenn any alcohol and that he never appeared noticeably intoxicated.

Bouwsma’s affidavit was enough to end the case. It was detailed and based on personal knowledge, and it showed “that two essential elements of the cause of action under OCGA § 51-1-40 (b) could not be met by the plaintiff.” The plaintiff filed no evidence in response, so there was nothing for a jury to decide, and summary judgment for Bouwsma was affirmed.

5. Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Townsend (2005)

Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Townsend, 279 Ga. 511, Supreme Court of Georgia, decided June 16, 2005

Jack Townsend alleged that William Serio became intoxicated on wine served during a Delta flight from Milwaukee to Atlanta, then drove home from the airport and struck Townsend’s car head-on. The trial court dismissed the claims against Delta, and the Court of Appeals reinstated the one based on the dram shop statute.

The statute did not reach an airline serving passengers in flight. Because it departs from the common law, it is read strictly, and the Court concluded that “the General Assembly intended to abrogate the common law principle that the negligent driver is the sole proximate cause of injuries resulting from his inebriated condition only in the limited case of a traditional land-based supplier of the alcohol.” The Court also explained that the statute requires knowledge that the drinker “will soon be driving” and that no Georgia law requires a provider to stop an intoxicated person from driving. The Court of Appeals was reversed; one justice dissented.

6. Flores v. Exprezit! Stores 98-Georgia, LLC (2011)

Flores v. Exprezit! Stores 98-Georgia, LLC, 289 Ga. 466, Supreme Court of Georgia, decided July 5, 2011

Viewed in favor of the plaintiffs, the evidence was that Billy Joe Grundell drove to a convenience store about four hours before a collision, was noticeably intoxicated when he bought a 12-pack of beer, and drank it with a passenger after driving off. He later crossed the centerline and hit a van head-on; six people were killed and several injured, and his blood alcohol concentration was 0.181. The Court of Appeals held that the statute never applies to sales of closed containers meant to be consumed elsewhere.

That categorical rule was rejected. The question was whether the statute applies “when a convenience store sells closed or packaged containers of alcohol not intended for consumption on the premises to a noticeably intoxicated adult,” and the Court answered: “We hold that it does and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.” One justice dissented.

7. Patel v. Brim (2026)

Patel v. Brim, No. A26A1087, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided July 27, 2026

According to the complaint, high school students attending a graduation party on Richard T. Brim III’s farm in Terrell County brought their own alcohol, and one of them, David Mullins, drove away intoxicated and hit a tree half a mile from the farm. Mullins died and his passenger, Vansh Patel, was seriously injured. The Patels conceded that Brim had not sold or provided any alcohol but argued that the statute should reach a landowner who allowed underage drinking and did nothing to stop it. The trial court dismissed the complaint.

Only a person who provides the alcohol can be liable. The statute “establishes a right of action only against a defendant who furnishes alcohol and not against one who merely furnishes the premises upon which alcohol is consumed,” and the court declined to expand it: “We cannot add a line to the law.” Subsection (d), which protects owners from liability for drinking on their property without their consent, does not by implication create liability when an owner consents. The dismissal was affirmed.

Proving Noticeable Intoxication

For an adult drinker, a plaintiff must show that the drinker was noticeably intoxicated when served. The seven decisions below turn on how that is proved: eyewitness testimony, blood alcohol results with and without expert testimony, a record of service, and the facts admitted when a bar failed to answer a lawsuit.

8. La Cosecha, Inc. v. Hall (2000)

La Cosecha, Inc. v. Hall, 246 Ga. App. 441, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided October 20, 2000

On January 4, 1998, Daniel Hall spent the day drinking with friends, and around 6:00 p.m. one of them, Tatum, drove the group to La Parilla, a Mexican restaurant, where Tatum had a large beer, a frozen margarita and a shot of tequila at the bar and the others drank similar amounts. A friend testified that Tatum did not appear intoxicated when they left, and no one discussed driving in front of the bartender. After two or three more hours at another bar, Tatum lost control of his vehicle, and Hall, his passenger, was killed. Hall’s widow sued the restaurant, and the trial court denied it summary judgment.

The restaurant was entitled to summary judgment. Against direct testimony that Tatum did not appear intoxicated, the widow offered only a forensic pathologist’s opinion built on assumptions the record did not support, including marijuana use Tatum said only that he “could have” had and drink counts not in evidence. “Guesses or speculation which raise merely a conjecture or possibility are not sufficient,” the court held, and the denial was reversed.

9. Northside Equities, Inc. v. Hulsey (2002)

Northside Equities, Inc. v. Hulsey, 275 Ga. 364, Supreme Court of Georgia, decided July 11, 2002

Rebecca Greene, who worked at an adult entertainment establishment owned by Northside Equities, drank five or six drinks during her workday and, on her way home, struck and killed the plaintiff’s daughter. Her blood alcohol content was .18 two hours after she left work. Northside submitted affidavits from employees who said Greene was not noticeably intoxicated, and the trial court granted it summary judgment; the Court of Appeals reversed.

The Supreme Court affirmed, 4 to 3. The question was whether scientific evidence of blood alcohol could create a fact question against direct testimony that the driver did not appear intoxicated, and the Court held that it could: the mother’s “evidence regarding Greene’s level of intoxication, taken together with expert testimony that such a level of intoxication would produce manifestations of intoxication, was sufficient to create a question of fact and, thereby, to avoid summary judgment.” The dissent argued that the majority had “changed the statutory duty from observing a person’s appearance to determining a person’s actual blood alcohol level.”

10. Wright v. Pine Hills Country Club, Inc. (2003)

Wright v. Pine Hills Country Club, Inc., 261 Ga. App. 748, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided June 18, 2003

Michele Yawn, a newspaper reporter, attended a July 6, 1999, festival gala at Pine Hills Country Club, where a volunteer bartender served her two glasses of red wine early in the evening. Both bartenders and a man who spent much of the evening with her said she did not appear intoxicated, and he walked her to her car. Driving home, she stopped on a state highway facing oncoming traffic with her lights off, and Heather Katrina Wright’s car struck hers, killing Yawn and seriously injuring Wright. Yawn’s blood alcohol level after her death was 0.18.

A blood test alone did not show how Yawn appeared when she was served. Unlike the plaintiff in Northside Equities (No. 9), Wright offered no expert testimony to connect the blood test to Yawn’s condition when she was served: “there is simply no expert testimony to contradict the testimony presented by McKinney and the two volunteer bartenders that Yawn was not noticeably intoxicated at the time that she was served alcohol.” There was also no evidence that anyone at the club knew she would soon be driving. Summary judgment for the club was affirmed, and a claim against Yawn’s employer failed because she was not working that evening.

11. Capp v. Carlito’s Mexican Bar & Grill #1, Inc. (2007)

Capp v. Carlito’s Mexican Bar & Grill #1, Inc., 288 Ga. App. 779, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided November 9, 2007

A waiter at Carlito’s, Nathan Bowers, invited his friend Leilani Raker and two teenagers, ages 15 and 14, for free food and drinks, and Raker drove them there in her truck with her 10-month-old son. According to the teenagers, Raker had four or five margaritas and one or two shots, and one of them described her “loud and obnoxiousness” starting around midnight, and there was evidence that she was served another drink after a phone call and that Bowers “topped off” her margarita as they left. Bowers, who had also been drinking, said he was more impaired than Raker. Driving home at high speed, she rolled the truck into a water-filled ditch, and her son was thrown into the water and had to be resuscitated. His grandmother, who later adopted him, sued, and the trial court granted Carlito’s summary judgment.

The appeal produced a split result. The conflicting accounts of witnesses who had all been drinking raised a jury question on whether Bowers served Raker while she was noticeably intoxicated, so summary judgment on liability was reversed. But the grandmother could not recover medical expenses incurred before her adoption became final, and punitive damages were unavailable against the restaurant: under § 51-12-5.1 (f), “punitive damages against a server of alcohol, such as Carlito’s, are not authorized,” because only the impaired “active tort-feasor” can be liable for them.

12. Shin v. Estate of Camacho (2010)

Shin v. Estate of Camacho, 302 Ga. App. 243, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided January 21, 2010

At a July 3, 2005, barbecue at Ki Soo Shin’s home, guest Seung Park drank two beers and three to five servings of sake, then argued and scuffled with another guest, at which point Shin and his wife concluded that he was intoxicated. Shin put the alcohol away. Park said he later drank two glasses of soju but did not remember who poured them, and Shin did not see it. The Shins urged Park to rest, stay or let them drive him home; after lying on a couch for 45 to 90 minutes he left, saying he was fine, and within 15 minutes ran a red light and crashed into Stacey Camacho’s car, killing her and injuring her son. The trial court denied Shin summary judgment.

Seeing that Park was drunk did not make Shin liable. There was “no record evidence that Shin knowingly furnished or served alcoholic beverages to a noticeably intoxicated Park,” since nothing showed that Shin knew or should have known of any drink after Park’s intoxication became apparent, and the denial of summary judgment was reversed. The court noted that Georgia law does not require a provider to prevent an intoxicated person from driving, and that a claim under § 51-1-40 (b) is “an injured person’s exclusive remedy” against a provider for damage caused by a driver who consumed the alcohol.

13. Freese II, Inc. v. Mitchell (2012)

Freese II, Inc. v. Mitchell, 318 Ga. App. 662, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided November 20, 2012

The complaint alleged that Otis South drank at Club Blaze, a club operated by Freese II, Inc., while noticeably intoxicated, that the club knew he would soon be driving, and that with a blood alcohol level of 0.398 he drove the wrong way onto a freeway and killed Fatima Bird in a head-on collision. The club did not answer on time and was held in default, and a jury awarded Bird’s mother, as administrator and as conservator of Bird’s two children, $1,750,000 in damages.

A default admits well-pleaded facts but not legal conclusions, and the facts alleged here “support a claim against Freese under OCGA § 51-1-40.” The club could not reopen the default without paying costs, could not have the jury apportion fault to South because it never gave the notice § 51-12-33 (d) (1) requires, and could not dispute proximate cause once liability was established. The judgment was affirmed.

14. Kendrick v. RJM Trading, Inc. (2025)

Kendrick v. RJM Trading, Inc., No. A25A0772, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided October 31, 2025

On December 7, 2019, Kathleen Arnsdorff, 29, spent about five hours at Fish Tales, where three bartenders served her several drinks, the last a glass of straight vodka at about 10:39 p.m. She then went to Game Time Sports Bar just before closing and was served a margarita. When Chad Kendrick and a friend could not find the man who had driven them there, Arnsdorff offered to drive them in that man’s pickup truck, using keys Kendrick had; she reached 100 miles per hour and crashed into a utility pole and a tree, and Kendrick died. His widow sued both establishments, and the trial court granted both summary judgment. This appeal was decided together with the one against Fish Tales, No. A25A0771.

Both judgments were affirmed, for different reasons. At Fish Tales, bartenders who knew Arnsdorff testified that she was not noticeably intoxicated, and the widow’s expert’s reconstruction “did not contradict the direct evidence.” At Game Time, the expert’s testimony did create a fact question about her condition, but “there was no evidence that Arnsdorff displayed a car key at any time or otherwise did anything to indicate that she might be driving,” and testimony that most customers arrive by car was not enough.

Knowing the Drinker Will Soon Be Driving

The statute also requires that the provider know, or in the exercise of reasonable care should know, that the drinker “will soon be driving.” In 2005 the Supreme Court agreed that requiring providers to find out how a patron plans to get home would impose an “affirmative duty” that “exceeds the duty established by the legislature,” and in 2025 the Court of Appeals quoted a dictionary definition of “soon” as “[i]n the near future; shortly.” The seven decisions below apply that element.

15. Griffin Motel Co. v. Strickland (1996)

Griffin Motel Co. v. Strickland, 223 Ga. App. 812, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided November 18, 1996

In return for repairing a motel’s air conditioning, the general manager of Griffin Motel took a group of men to the motel bar and bought them two drinks each, and they kept drinking after he left. John Wilson, who had come to give a motel employee a ride home, had one more drink than the others and told the employee several times, “let’s go.” The bartender woke that employee in Wilson’s truck to help with another man who had fallen, and the desk clerk watched Wilson help that man into the truck and drive off. Wilson missed a curve; passenger Thomas Strickland was killed and others were hurt. The motel argued that the passengers, who had also been drinking, were barred as “consumers.”

The passengers could sue, and the case went forward. The court read the consumer bar to mean “one who purchases and consumes alcohol, then injures himself; not one who purchases and consumes alcohol, then is injured by another.” It also applied the Riley standard of constructive knowledge to adult drinkers and held that the evidence raised genuine issues “as to whether Griffin Motel should have known that Wilson would be driving soon after leaving the bar.” The denial of summary judgment was affirmed.

16. Hodges v. Erickson (2003)

Hodges v. Erickson, 264 Ga. App. 516, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided August 4, 2003

Paul and Brenda Erickson hosted a party of 50 to 60 guests on January 23, 1999, with an unattended, self-service bar in their basement, and arranged for their son’s friends to spend the night. Brian Hammock, 21, came at his brother’s invitation without the family’s knowledge. Around 3:00 a.m. his brother told him not to leave because he had been drinking; Brian agreed to stay and put his keys in his pocket, but left once his brother fell asleep and collided with David Hodges’s car about half a mile away. He pleaded guilty to driving under the influence.

The guest’s own statement that he would not drive was direct evidence against the knowledge element. There was no evidence that Brian was noticeably intoxicated when he was furnished alcohol, and on the driving element the court held: “Brian was asked whether he would be driving and responded that he would not. This is direct evidence that Brian would not soon be driving, and contrary knowledge may not be imputed to the Ericksons.” Riley (No. 1) and Griffin Motel (No. 15) require at least implied knowledge; they do not impose a duty to ask. Summary judgment for the Ericksons was affirmed.

17. Sugarloaf Café, Inc. v. Willbanks (2005)

Sugarloaf Café, Inc. v. Willbanks, 279 Ga. 255, Supreme Court of Georgia, decided April 26, 2005

Jennifer Phillips left her car at work and rode with a coworker to Buffalo’s Café, where over about five hours the bartender served her roughly ten glasses of wine. Another coworker drove her back to work, and on her way home in her own car she crossed the centerline and hit a car carrying Rebecca Willbanks and Amanda Lawrence, who were seriously injured. The trial court granted the restaurant summary judgment on the ground that it could not have known she would soon be driving, and the Court of Appeals reversed because the restaurant’s “remote” location meant customers came by car.

The Supreme Court reversed. The evidence showed that Buffalo’s sat in a shopping center surrounded by office parks, that Phillips’s office was “two minutes” away on foot, and that she did not drive to or from the restaurant. An expert’s affidavit about traffic patterns and the absence of public transportation “cannot be used to contradict the direct evidence showing that Phillips did not drive to or from Buffalo’s because it is based only on inferences and does not establish the conclusion that Buffalo’s knew Phillips would be driving soon after she left.”

18. Becks v. Pierce (2006)

Becks v. Pierce, 282 Ga. App. 229, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided November 2, 2006

Jeffery Fleming spent five to five and a half hours at Jay’s Place Sports Bar and Lounge on the night of April 12, 2002, drinking two or three vodka-and-cranberry drinks and two cups of beer, and left at about 3:30 a.m., walking past a security guard and two police officers. He fell asleep at the wheel, crossed the median and struck a car in which Mary Pierce was a passenger; his blood alcohol concentration was 0.109. There was testimony that most of the bar’s customers arrived by car and that no one asked Fleming whether he would be driving. The trial court denied the bar summary judgment.

Nothing Fleming did at the bar signaled that he would drive. There was “an absence of evidence to satisfy the statutory requirement that the appellant knew that Fleming was soon to drive”: nothing showed he displayed keys or otherwise signaled that he would drive, and under Sugarloaf (No. 17), evidence that most patrons drive is not enough. The denial of summary judgment was reversed.

19. Baxley v. Hakiel Industries, Inc. (2007)

Baxley v. Hakiel Industries, Inc., 282 Ga. 312, Supreme Court of Georgia, decided June 25, 2007

After drinking at two bars, Brewsters and The Place, Mary Karafiat collided with motorcyclist Marcus Dwayne Baxley, who was seriously injured. Brewsters’s manager learned of the accident that night and of Karafiat’s involvement the next day and questioned her staff about what Karafiat had been served, but the bar’s surveillance tape from that night was recorded over four days later in the ordinary course of business. The trial court found a fact question on noticeable intoxication but granted both bars summary judgment because there was no evidence they knew Karafiat would soon be driving, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

As to Brewsters, the Supreme Court reversed. Once the manager began investigating, litigation was contemplated, and because the tape could have shown whether Karafiat would soon be driving, for example by showing her walking through the bar “with keys in hand or leaving with another person,” “a rebuttable presumption arose against Brewsters.” The Court did not address The Place, which had no cameras.

20. Monterrey Mex, Inc. v. Collins (2024)

Monterrey Mex, Inc. v. Collins, 372 Ga. App. 70, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided June 24, 2024

By her account, Margaret Gorham, who was under 21, regularly drank at Monterrey Mex’s Roswell restaurant because it did not check identification, and on September 15, 2019, she parked directly in front of the restaurant’s large windows, walked in holding a car key with a visible Honda emblem, and kept her keys in plain view at the table while she was served three margaritas and likely two shots of tequila. Hours later, after going to another bar, she rear-ended Jamel Lamarr Collins’s disabled car on Georgia 400 with a blood alcohol level of .25. The trial court denied the restaurant summary judgment.

Keys in plain view and a car parked outside the window were enough for a jury. Providers need not ask how a patron will leave, but the court noted prior decisions indicating that keys in plain view may raise a jury question, and here “the evidence was sufficient to create a jury question as to whether Monterrey knew or should have known that Gorham would soon be driving.” The denial was affirmed.

21. Sepid, LLC v. Merchant (2025)

Sepid, LLC v. Merchant, 374 Ga. App. 825, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided February 24, 2025

In January 2019, Antoine McLendon, a soldier at Fort Stewart, was driven to GATA’s Sports Bar and Grill by a friend who did not drink. McLendon had at least three drinks there before his girlfriend took his drink away and a bouncer cut him off, and his friend later drove him back to the barracks. McLendon then decided to drive his own car to see his girlfriend, and on the way back he rear-ended a car carrying three teenagers, killing Albert Dock and injuring Deven Merchant. The trial court denied the bar summary judgment in both resulting suits, which were decided together.

Nothing tied the bar to McLendon’s later decision to drive. He “was transported by a designated driver” both to and from the bar, nothing suggested he had keys or planned to drive, and neither a social media post nor a staff policy of assuming every patron would drive showed what the bar knew about him: “[GATA’s] policy cannot supplant the statutory requirement.” The denials were reversed, and the court held that the statute was the plaintiffs’ exclusive remedy against the bar.

Injuries That Did Not Come From Driving

The statute’s exceptions concern drinkers who will soon be driving. The four decisions below involve a fall from a moving vehicle, a bar fight, a hotel room assault and a sexual assault at a party, and they show when the statute bars a claim and when a different theory survives.

22. Lumpkin v. Mellow Mushroom (2002)

Lumpkin v. Mellow Mushroom, 256 Ga. App. 83, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided June 24, 2002

Christian Lumpkin, 18, drank beer at Mellow Mushroom’s bar on the evening of June 7, 2000; the restaurant was known among his peers as a place that served beer to underage customers. After leaving, he rode as a passenger in a friend’s Jeep that had no passenger-side door, unbuckled his seat belt, hung out of the vehicle and fell, suffering fatal injuries. His parents sued the restaurant for serving him, and the trial court granted it summary judgment.

The court accepted that serving an 18-year-old violated the law, but the statute’s exception for minors reflects “a legislative intent to limit the exception to those cases in which the underaged person causes an injury while driving,” and Lumpkin was not driving. A violation of the underage sales statute, § 3-3-23, could not supply the missing causation: “it cannot, alone, leap the common law’s chasm of causation.” Summary judgment was affirmed.

23. Mulligan’s Bar & Grill v. Stanfield (2008)

Mulligan’s Bar & Grill v. Stanfield, 294 Ga. App. 250, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided October 27, 2008

Bruce Stanfield was playing pool at Mulligan’s when a beer bottle struck him in the face during a fight between two other patrons, both of whom had earlier been barred from the bar for fighting. At least five employees and the owner knew of the bottle thrower’s combative behavior as early as three hours before, and staff had warned management that security was inadequate. A jury awarded Stanfield $192,100, and the bar argued on appeal that the dram shop statute barred the claim.

Stanfield’s case was “grounded in established Georgia premises liability law,” not in the sale of alcohol, and “the Georgia Dram Shop Act was never intended to and does not pertain to premises liability claims like the one before this Court. Even liquor stores and bars are required to keep their premises safe.” The verdict was affirmed. As noted above, claims for negligent security arising on or after April 21, 2025, are subject to the statutory provisions enacted in 2025 SB 68.

24. Solley v. Mullins Trucking Co. (2009)

Solley v. Mullins Trucking Co., 301 Ga. App. 565, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided December 10, 2009

Mullins Trucking hosted a St. Patrick’s Day trip to Savannah in March 2006 for employees and business associates, and its sole officer, Jimmy Mullins, bought about $700 worth of alcohol for a hospitality suite. Mullins drank all day. When Barbara Jean Solley, the company’s office manager and his girlfriend, took his car keys that evening, he later attacked her in their hotel room, choking her and threatening to kill her. She sued the company for failing to stop a dangerous activity, and the trial court granted it summary judgment.

The “dangerous activity” Solley pointed to was serving Mullins alcohol, and “because OCGA § 51-1-40 specifically sets forth that only the consumption, not the service of alcoholic beverages, is the proximate cause for injuries inflicted by the intoxicated person, Mullins Trucking cannot be liable for Solley’s injuries.” The same rules apply when the provider is an employer, and the claim also failed when analyzed as one for premises liability. Summary judgment was affirmed.

25. Leavy v. Cornelius (2025)

Leavy v. Cornelius, 376 Ga. App. 685, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided August 26, 2025

According to the complaint, on New Year’s Eve 2021 a 15-year-old girl attended a party hosted by Clarence Howard Leavy IV’s son at the Leavy home, where a boy gave her alcohol he had bought on the way and then sexually assaulted her after both became intoxicated. Her parents sued Leavy for negligence in providing alcohol to minors and failing to supervise the party, and the trial court denied his motion to dismiss.

The single negligence count rested entirely on the provision and consumption of alcohol, and “it is well-settled that a claim relating to furnishing alcohol is barred by the Act.” The denial of the motion to dismiss was reversed. The court distinguished cases like Mulligan’s (No. 23), where a separately pleaded premises or security claim survived; no such claim was pleaded here. A claim by the parents under § 51-1-18 had not been ruled on below, so the court did not address it.

Claims by the Drinker and the Drinker’s Family

The statute provides that nothing in it “shall authorize the consumer of any alcoholic beverage to recover from the provider of such alcoholic beverage for injuries or damages suffered by the consumer.” A separate statute, § 51-1-18 (a), gives custodial parents a right of action against anyone who sells or furnishes alcohol to their underage child without permission. The five decisions below apply both; Griffin Motel (No. 15) addresses passengers who had also been drinking.

26. Steedley v. Huntley’s Jiffy Stores, Inc. (1993)

Steedley v. Huntley’s Jiffy Stores, Inc., 209 Ga. App. 23, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided June 10, 1993

Scott Steedley was driving the truck in a collision with a passenger van in which six people were killed. He and his parents sued the convenience store and clerk who allegedly provided him alcohol knowing he would be driving, seeking damages for his own injuries, and the trial court granted the defendants summary judgment.

Steedley could not sue for his own injuries. “[A] consumer of alcohol, even an underage consumer, may not recover from the provider of that alcohol for injuries resulting from consumption of the alcohol,” a rule from the Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in Sutter v. Hutchings that “was not altered by the enactment of OCGA § 51-1-40.” His parents’ claim under § 51-1-18 (a) failed for the same reason, under a 1989 decision barring parents from using that statute to recover for injuries the consumer could not recover for himself. Summary judgment was affirmed.

27. Eldridge v. Aronson (1996)

Eldridge v. Aronson, 221 Ga. App. 662, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided June 6, 1996

On March 11, 1989, Patricia Aronson bought wine coolers and six or seven cases of beer for a party at her home for her son’s high school friends. A 16-year-old testified that she encouraged the students to help themselves from the refrigerator and stood by as 16-year-old David Eldridge took a beer; she denied serving him. Her husband was out of town, but there was evidence the couple had served alcohol to high school students before. David’s parents sued under § 51-1-18 (a), and the trial court granted both Aronsons summary judgment under the rule that a consumer cannot recover from a provider.

That rule did not apply. Section 51-1-18 (a) is “a statutory tort vesting a right to a cause of action to custodial parents of a minor child against anyone who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to and for the use of their minor child without the parent’s permission,” and here “the alleged consumer (David Eldridge) did not bring an action for damages and is not a party”; the parents sued in their own right. Fact questions remained as to whether each Aronson furnished alcohol to David, and summary judgment was reversed.

28. Mowell v. Marks (2004)

Mowell v. Marks, 269 Ga. App. 147, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided August 13, 2004

According to the complaint, on August 11, 2000, 16-year-old Kirby went to a party at Rosanne Marks’s home, where two minors had brought two kegs of beer that Marks told them where to place. Kirby drank from the kegs and about three hours later tried to drive herself home; her car rolled over and she died, with a blood alcohol level of 0.16. Her mother sued Marks and the two minors for wrongful death, and the trial court dismissed the dram shop and negligence claims.

Her mother’s claim could rise no higher than Kirby’s own. The provider “is not liable for injuries suffered by the minor,” and a wrongful death claim is derivative: “A survivor cannot recover for the decedent’s wrongful death if the decedent could not have recovered in his or her own right.” The court rejected the argument that the consumer bar is merely procedural, explaining that it reflects the consumer’s greater share of fault, and it distinguished Eldridge (No. 27) as a claim under § 51-1-18. The dismissal was affirmed.

29. Penny v. McBride (2006)

Penny v. McBride, 282 Ga. App. 590, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided November 28, 2006

According to the complaint, the McBrides’ 20-year-old daughter was served alcohol without their consent at a social event hosted by Jane and Michael Penny, then drove away with a blood alcohol level of 0.179, ran a stop sign, jumped a curb and struck a tree, dying in the crash. Acknowledging that § 51-1-40 did not allow them to recover, the parents sued under § 51-1-18 (a), and the trial court denied the Pennys’ motion to dismiss.

Turning 18 ended the parents’ claim. Section 51-1-18 (a) gives the right of action to “the custodial parent or parents,” and parents no longer have custody of a child who has reached 18, the age of majority, even if the child is under the drinking age. “Because the McBrides’ daughter, as alleged in the complaint, was 20 at the time of the incident, the trial court should have granted the Pennys’ motion to dismiss the McBrides’ claims.” The denial was reversed.

30. Dion v. Y.S.G. Enterprises, Inc. (2014)

Dion v. Y.S.G. Enterprises, Inc., 296 Ga. 185, Supreme Court of Georgia, decided November 17, 2014

According to the complaint, Dale Dion drank at the Depot Sports Bar and Grill from 2:30 p.m. until 10:43 p.m. on September 15, 2011, while visibly intoxicated, and refused an employee’s request for his car keys. Early the next morning he died in a single-car wreck with a blood alcohol content of 0.282. His widow sued the bar for wrongful death, and the trial court dismissed the complaint and rejected her challenge to the statute’s constitutionality.

The consumer bar decided the case. The new causes of action the statute created cover only injuries to third parties, and it states that nothing in it authorizes a consumer to recover from the provider; as to the consumer, “there has been no change in the common law,” under which selling alcohol to a drinker is too remote to cause injury to himself. Neither the general tort statute, § 51-1-6, nor § 3-3-22, which prohibits serving a noticeably intoxicated person, supplied a basis for the claim, and the argument that the statute violates the separation of powers was “meritless.” The dismissal was affirmed.

Notes on the Decisions

Decisions were drawn from the Supreme Court of Georgia and the Court of Appeals of Georgia. A Court of Appeals decision was used only if no judge on the panel concurred specially or in the judgment only, since either kind of concurrence can make a Georgia decision, or part of it, physical precedent rather than binding authority. Each summary was written from the opinion. Most of these cases were decided on summary judgment, where the evidence is viewed in favor of the party opposing the motion, or on a motion to dismiss, where the complaint’s allegations are taken as true; the summaries say which. Georgia Reports and Georgia Appeals Reports citations are given where they appeared in the reporter text or in a published opinion, and otherwise the docket number is given. Where a later decision on this page discussed an earlier one, the summaries say so, but no full review of each decision’s later history was performed. Research for this page was completed in September 2026.

Legislative Summaries Cited

Summary of General Statutes Enacted at the 2nd Session of the 157th General Assembly (2024), Georgia Office of Legislative Counsel

Summary of General Statutes Enacted at the 1st Session of the 158th General Assembly (2025), Georgia Office of Legislative Counsel

Summary of General Statutes Enacted at the 2nd Session of the 158th General Assembly (2026), Georgia Office of Legislative Counsel

About This Page

This page describes published appellate decisions for general information only and is not legal advice. It does not address whether any particular person or business is responsible for any particular injury. Liability for serving alcohol depends on the specific facts, the version of the statute in effect at the time, and later decisions of the Georgia courts and acts of the General Assembly.