Georgia Insurance Bad Faith Case Law: 30 Court Decisions on Settlement Demands and Claim Handling

Two different kinds of claim go by the name “bad faith” in Georgia. The first belongs to an insured person whose liability insurer passed up a chance to settle an injury claim within the policy limits, leaving the insured with a larger judgment; in 1992 the Supreme Court of Georgia repeated the rule that an insurer deciding whether to settle “must give equal consideration to the interests of the insured.” The second is statutory: OCGA § 33-4-6 allows a policyholder to recover a penalty and attorney fees when an insurer refuses in bad faith to pay a covered loss, and OCGA § 33-4-7 imposes duties on motor vehicle liability insurers handling property damage claims. A third statute, OCGA § 9-11-67.1, governs how pre-suit offers to settle motor vehicle injury claims are made and accepted, and much recent litigation over failure to settle begins with a dispute under it. The 30 appellate decisions below trace all three.

Results differ by subject, so this page does not total them. Of the ten decisions on the duty to settle, six went against the insurer and four for it. All six decisions on who may bring a failure-to-settle claim, and when, favored the insurer. Of the seven decisions on pre-suit offers, four held that no settlement was formed, two held that one was, and one answered a question of law about how such offers may be conditioned. Of the seven decisions under §§ 33-4-6 and 33-4-7, five favored the insurer and two were split. Nine decisions are from the Supreme Court of Georgia, four of them answers to questions certified by federal courts (Nos. 9, 15, 16 and 17), and 21 are from the Court of Appeals of Georgia. The links go to each opinion as published in the Caselaw Access Project’s reporter text or as a court PDF archived by CourtListener.

The Statutes Now in Force

FindLaw’s text of OCGA § 33-4-6 (a) and § 33-4-7 (a), current as of March 28, 2024, is the source for the statutory language quoted here, and no summary of general statutes from the 2024, 2025 or 2026 sessions of the General Assembly lists a change to either section. Section 9-11-67.1 has changed twice since it was first enacted; as the Court of Appeals put it in 2026, it “was enacted in 2013 and amended in 2021 and 2024.” As passed, 2024 Senate Bill 83 provides that “[a]ny offer to settle a tort claim for personal injury, bodily injury, or death arising from a motor vehicle collision shall be an offer to enter into a bilateral contract,” lists the material terms such an offer made before an answer is filed must contain, and provides that “[t]here shall be no civil action arising from an alleged failure by the recipient to settle” when the recipient timely accepts the material terms, provides any required sworn statement about coverage, and pays the lesser of the amount demanded or the available bodily injury limits. The bill states that it applies to offers made on or after the date the Governor approved it; the Legislative Counsel’s 2024 summary lists July 1, 2024, as its effective date. The decisions on this page arose under the versions in effect before the 2024 amendment, and the summaries note the version where the court identified it.

The Duty to Settle Within Policy Limits

A liability insurer that negligently or in bad faith fails to settle a claim within the policy limits may be liable to its insured for a judgment above those limits. The ten decisions below address what triggers that duty, how the insurer’s response is judged, and what an insured or assignee may recover.

1. Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Gingold (1982)

Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Gingold, 249 Ga. 156, Supreme Court of Georgia, decided March 10, 1982

After a 1974 collision, GEICO’s insured, James Stephen Johnston, faced a claim by Kay Woody with only $10,000 in liability coverage. GEICO was willing to pay the limits for a release, but Woody’s lawyer would offer only a covenant not to sue, because the injured woman planned to sue Ford Motor Company and he believed a release would bar that suit. The lawyers for GEICO and Johnston rejected the covenant because it would not protect Johnston if Ford later sought contribution or indemnity from him, and their counterproposal of a covenant with an indemnity clause was also rejected. Johnston had disappeared, and a $121,000 judgment followed. The Court of Appeals found fact questions in the excess suit.

“The problem was one of weighing relative risks,” the Supreme Court wrote, and because the insured “had run off,” GEICO could not learn his preferences or get his help; “if anyone should bear legal responsibility for the $121,000 judgment, it is the insured himself.” The Court of Appeals was reversed.

2. Southern General Insurance Co. v. Holt (1992)

Southern General Insurance Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, Supreme Court of Georgia, decided May 21, 1992

Bridget Holt ran a stop sign on June 19, 1987, and injured Geneva Fortson; her liability was undisputed. Southern General declined to reveal its $15,000 limits. On November 2, Fortson’s lawyer offered to settle for the limits within ten days, enclosing records of a herniated disk and $6,568 in medical bills, sent proof of $4,335 more, and then extended the deadline to November 17 with her complete records. Southern General neither responded nor asked for more time, the offer was withdrawn, and its later offers of the limits were refused. A jury awarded Fortson $82,000, Holt assigned her claim against the insurer to Fortson, and a second jury found the insurer liable.

The verdict on the failure to settle stood. “An insurance company does not act in bad faith solely because it fails to accept a settlement offer within the deadline set by the injured person’s attorney,” the Court held, but it rejected “Southern General’s argument that an insurance company has no duty to its insured to respond to a deadline to settle a claim within policy limits when the company has knowledge of clear liability and special damages exceeding the policy limits.” Its own claims manager had testified that the case should have been recognized as a policy-limits case, so a jury question was presented. The punitive award to Holt was reversed, because after assigning her claim she had no claim for compensatory damages to support it.

3. Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Brightman (2003)

Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Brightman, 276 Ga. 683, Supreme Court of Georgia, decided April 29, 2003

James Brightman was injured in a 1992 collision with a van owned by Cotton States’ insured; his lawyer later wrote that he had sustained a traumatic brain injury. After Cotton States refused a 1994 demand for its $300,000 limits and an arbitration panel awarded Brightman $2 million, his lawyer gave the insurer “one last chance” in January 1995: $300,000 within ten days, contingent on State Farm, which insured the van’s driver, also paying its $100,000 limits. Neither insurer paid within the deadline; Cotton States offered its limits six weeks later and was refused. A jury awarded Brightman nearly $1.8 million, leaving an excess judgment, and in the assigned bad faith suit a jury found against Cotton States.

An insurer is “[j]udged by the standard of the ordinarily prudent insurer,” and a condition involving another insurer did not excuse Cotton States as a matter of law, given expert testimony that it could have put its own limits on the table, and the verdict was affirmed. The Court disapproved the Court of Appeals’ language placing on insurers “an affirmative duty … to engage in negotiations,” and instead held that an insurer “faced with a demand involving multiple insurers can create a safe harbor from liability for an insured’s bad faith claim under Holt by meeting the portion of the demand over which it has control.”

4. Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Driskell (2003)

Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Driskell, 264 Ga. App. 646, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided October 24, 2003

After a 1995 collision with a Metro Courier vehicle, the Harrises demanded $1,000,000 from Metro’s insurer, Empire, which refused both to defend and to settle. An arbitration award of $3,150,000 became a judgment, and Metro assigned its claims against Empire to the Harrises. In an earlier appeal, the court had held that an endorsement to the policy provided $200,000 in coverage and that, because the Harrises never offered to settle within that amount, they could not recover the entire judgment as damages for failure to settle. A jury nonetheless awarded $6,480,000 on that claim.

The award could not stand. The earlier ruling limiting failure-to-settle damages to $200,000 was binding, and Empire had already paid that amount with interest, so the $6,480,000 judgment was reversed. The court also affirmed a directed verdict on punitive damages, because the Harrises sued only as Metro’s assignees and “the right to punitive damages cannot be assigned.”

5. Fortner v. Grange Mutual Casualty Co. (2009)

Fortner v. Grange Mutual Casualty Co., 286 Ga. 189, Supreme Court of Georgia, decided October 19, 2009

Cecil Fortner, injured in a 2003 crash caused by Alan Arnsdorff, offered to settle for Grange’s $50,000 limits, contingent on the insurer of Arnsdorff’s business paying $750,000. That insurer did not respond, and Grange offered its limits only if Fortner signed “a full release with indemnification language” and dismissed his suit with prejudice. Fortner treated that as a rejection and won a $7 million verdict. In the assigned bad faith suit, the jury was told that an insurer facing a demand conditioned on another insurer’s response could offer its limits and let the plaintiff negotiate with the other insurer, and that in that situation the jury should find for the insurer. The jury did, and a divided Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Supreme Court reversed because the instruction misstated Brightman (No. 3). The safe harbor applies to conditions beyond the insurer’s control, and Grange had added conditions of its own, so the charge “was not consistent with the ‘safe harbor’ provision discussed in Brightman as adjusted to the evidence in this case.” The Court expressed “no opinion regarding whether Grange, in adding its own settlement conditions, ‘acted reasonably.'”

6. Southern General Insurance Co. v. Wellstar Health Systems, Inc. (2012)

Southern General Insurance Co. v. Wellstar Health Systems, Inc., 315 Ga. App. 26, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided March 20, 2012

In September 2007, Southern General’s insured struck Norman Gray, who was riding a bicycle, and Gray was treated at a Wellstar hospital for charges of $22,047.50; Wellstar gave notice of and filed hospital liens. Gray demanded the $25,000 policy limits within five days. Southern General sent a release requiring Gray to indemnify it against liens, Gray refused to sign an indemnity, and the insurer paid him the $25,000 anyway. Wellstar sued the insurer to enforce its liens, and Southern General argued that the time-limited demand rules and the hospital lien statutes could force it to pay more than its limits.

The court found no irreconcilable conflict and affirmed judgment for Wellstar. The trial court had reasoned that if the insurer had satisfied the lien from the policy proceeds, Gray would have received the full benefit of the payment he demanded, and the insurer would not have been exposed to a failure-to-settle claim. A constitutional argument was not considered because the trial court had not ruled on it.

7. Baker v. Huff (2013)

Baker v. Huff, 323 Ga. App. 357, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided July 5, 2013

Harlan Huff was killed in a December 2002 single-car crash, and his adult son Joshua, a passenger, was hurt. Joshua’s lawyer made time-limited demands for Liberty Mutual’s $100,000 limits, but he refused the insurer access to Joshua, revoked its medical authorization and said he had no information on Joshua’s treatment. Liberty Mutual told him it could not pay the limits without more information, and it tendered them only after receiving the neurologist’s records months later. Joshua refused and won a $278,806 judgment, leaving the estate with a potential claim against the insurer for the excess, and several suits followed over that claim.

Liberty Mutual was entitled to summary judgment on the failure-to-settle claim. An insurer “is not required to accept an offer which, under all the circumstances, imposes an unreasonably short period of time to respond,” and here “no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Liberty Mutual acted unreasonably when it failed to tender the $100,000 policy limits within the ten-day time limit.” Because the claim failed, the related claims against the estate’s former lawyer and others failed too, and the judgments were reversed.

8. First Acceptance Insurance Co. of Georgia v. Hughes (2019)

First Acceptance Insurance Co. of Georgia v. Hughes, 305 Ga. 489, Supreme Court of Georgia, decided March 11, 2019

Ronald Jackson, who died after causing a multi-vehicle collision in August 2008, had limits of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident with First Acceptance, which knew several people were hurt and hoped to reach a global settlement. On June 2, 2009, the lawyer for two claimants sent letters expressing interest in a settlement conference and, in the alternative, offering to settle for the available limits. The insurer’s lawyer did not read them as a time-limited demand, and the letters were filed with medical records. The offer was revoked in July, and one claimant later won more than $5.3 million. The trial court granted the insurer summary judgment; the Court of Appeals reversed.

The Supreme Court reinstated the insurer’s summary judgment. “[A]n insurer’s duty to settle arises only when the injured party presents a valid offer to settle within the insured’s policy limits,” the Court held. The letters were such an offer, but they set no deadline, so the offer remained open for a reasonable time, and as a matter of law the insurer “did not act unreasonably in failing to accept the offer before it was withdrawn.”

9. GEICO Indemnity Co. v. Whiteside (2021)

GEICO Indemnity Co. v. Whiteside, 311 Ga. 346, Supreme Court of Georgia, decided April 19, 2021

Bonnie Winslett, a permissive driver covered by GEICO, struck Terry Guthrie, who was riding a bicycle, in February 2012. GEICO accepted fault, rejected a demand for its $30,000 limit and counteroffered $12,409, and never asked Winslett to forward any suit papers. Guthrie sued six days after the rejection; Winslett threw away the papers without telling GEICO, and a $2,916,204 default judgment followed. After Guthrie forced her into bankruptcy, her trustee sued GEICO for failure to settle and won a jury verdict, and a federal appeals court asked the Supreme Court of Georgia whether her failure to give notice relieved GEICO of liability.

The answer was “a qualified ‘no.'” In this tort action, “neither OCGA § 33-7-15 nor the related endorsement in the insurance policy relieves GEICO of liability for the bad faith or negligent failure-to-settle claim”; the question was whether Winslett’s breach broke the causal chain between GEICO’s rejection of the demand and the judgment. The Court also rejected GEICO’s argument that it should be able to contest the amount of the default judgment, because that could leave the insured without full compensation. It noted that insureds, “but not their assignees,” may also seek punitive damages.

10. Cannon v. Safeco Insurance Co. of Illinois (2026)

Cannon v. Safeco Insurance Co. of Illinois, No. A25A1847, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided March 16, 2026

According to the complaint, Trever Cannon’s truck crossed a median in 2013 and struck a car, killing Camie Joyner and her husband and injuring their daughter. In 2014, before any demand for the limits, Safeco filed an interpleader action and paid its $100,000 per-accident limit into the court registry. Joyner’s estate later won a judgment of $1.65 million against Cannon for her pre-death pain and suffering. Cannon sued Safeco, alleging that it paid the limits into court without considering his interests, and the trial court dismissed the suit because no demand to settle within the limits had been made.

Hughes (No. 8) held that the duty to settle arises when a valid offer is presented, but it did not decide whether an insurer can be liable when its own conduct, such as unconditionally paying the limits into court, cuts off the chance for the insured to obtain a release; whether an insurer gave the insured the required consideration is “typically a jury issue.” At this early stage, the court could not say Cannon could prove no set of facts entitling him to relief, and the dismissal was reversed.

Who May Sue, and When

A failure-to-settle claim belongs to the insured, and Georgia courts have limited who else may bring it and when it arises. The six decisions below address injured claimants, judgment creditors, people outside the policy, and insureds who settled without the insurer’s consent.

11. Southern General Insurance Co. v. Ross (1997)

Southern General Insurance Co. v. Ross, 227 Ga. App. 191, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided June 27, 1997

Barbara Ross won a personal injury judgment against two people insured by Southern General, which then brought a declaratory judgment action over its obligation to pay post-judgment interest. Ross counterclaimed, asserting that the insurer had failed in bad faith to settle her claim against the insureds.

The court decided the interest dispute partly for each side and upheld summary judgment on the bad faith counterclaim, because Ross, “who was not an insured and had received no assignment of Barber’s claim, had no standing to do so.”

12. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Crump (1999)

Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Crump, 237 Ga. App. 96, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided February 22, 1999

Joyce Crump won a judgment of more than $1,000,000 against James Smith, whose policy with Metropolitan had a $25,000 per-person limit. Metropolitan paid its limits and interest into the court registry, and Crump then tried to garnish Smith’s potential claim against Metropolitan for failing to settle within the limits, a claim Smith had neither asserted nor assigned.

She could not. “[T]he judgment creditor here had no standing to pursue this garnishment,” the court held, and the trial court’s contrary ruling was reversed.

13. Richards v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (2001)

Richards v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 252 Ga. App. 45, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided October 15, 2001

Gary Richards claimed a back injury in a collision with a driver insured by State Farm. When settlement talks broke down, he sued the driver for damages and sued State Farm directly for bad faith refusal to settle, contending that he could sue as a third-party beneficiary of the policy.

“We find no standing to sue,” the Court of Appeals held, affirming dismissal of the claim against State Farm. The duty to settle runs to the insured, because the insurer “may not gamble” with the insured’s funds, and the statute that lets third parties sue insurers for bad faith, § 33-4-7, reaches only property damage claims.

14. Simpson v. Infinity Select Insurance Co. (2004)

Simpson v. Infinity Select Insurance Co., 269 Ga. App. 679, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided September 3, 2004

At 17, Gregory Wade Simpson crashed his girlfriend’s mother’s car, and his 16-year-old girlfriend, a passenger, suffered a severe brain injury. He did not answer the suit that followed, and a default led to more than $10 million in compensatory damages and $3 million in punitive damages after the court found he had been driving under the influence. Simpson then sued his stepfather’s insurer, which had $15,000 in limits, for failing to defend and to settle; the insurer said he was not covered.

The policy was not ambiguous and did not cover him, and “[b]ecause Simpson was not insured under the policy, his claims for breach of contract and bad faith failure to settle must also fail.” The insurer’s choice not to seek a declaratory judgment did not change the coverage, and summary judgment for the insurer was affirmed.

15. Trinity Outdoor, LLC v. Central Mutual Insurance Co. (2009)

Trinity Outdoor, LLC v. Central Mutual Insurance Co., 285 Ga. 583, Supreme Court of Georgia, decided June 1, 2009

In August 2002 a billboard fell while being installed on Trinity Outdoor’s property, killing two men. Trinity’s liability insurer, Central Mutual, offered $200,000 toward a mediated settlement; the case settled for $12 million, and without Central’s approval Trinity agreed to pay $954,530 and then sought the difference from Central. The policy allowed suit against the insurer only on a final judgment after trial or on a settlement it had signed, and a federal court asked whether a failure-to-settle claim requires a judgment above the policy limits.

On these facts, the Court answered yes. Absent “an excess verdict or agreed-upon settlement,” Trinity had no claim for negligent or bad faith failure to settle, and the Court did not reach the second question about what such a plaintiff must show.

16. Piedmont Office Realty Trust, Inc. v. XL Specialty Insurance Co. (2015)

Piedmont Office Realty Trust, Inc. v. XL Specialty Insurance Co., 297 Ga. 38, Supreme Court of Georgia, decided April 20, 2015

Piedmont, sued in a securities class action seeking more than $150 million, used up its primary coverage and $4 million of its $10 million excess policy with XL on defense costs. XL agreed to contribute $1 million to a settlement but no more, and Piedmont, without XL’s consent, settled for $4.9 million and sued XL for breach of contract and bad faith refusal to settle under § 33-4-6. The excess policy required XL’s consent to settle, which could not be “unreasonably withheld,” and barred suit until liability was fixed by judgment after trial or by an agreement signed by the insurer.

Answering certified questions, the Court held that “absent XL’s consent to the settlement, under the terms of the policy, Piedmont could not sue XL for bad faith refusal to settle the underlying lawsuit in the absence of a judgment against Piedmont after an actual trial,” and the dismissal of its complaint was proper.

Pre-Suit Offers Under Section 9-11-67.1

When an offer to settle a motor vehicle injury claim is disputed, the question is often whether a binding settlement was formed at all. The seven decisions below apply the 2013 and 2021 versions of § 9-11-67.1 to offers that required payment, releases and other acts as conditions of acceptance; for offers governed by the 2024 amendment, the statute’s protection for recipients who accept the material terms and pay, described above, also applies.

17. Grange Mutual Casualty Co. v. Woodard (2017)

Grange Mutual Casualty Co. v. Woodard, 300 Ga. 848, Supreme Court of Georgia, decided March 6, 2017

After a March 2014 collision killed Anna Woodard and injured her father, the family’s lawyer offered Grange, the other driver’s insurer, a limited release in exchange for its $100,000 limit, in a letter headed as an offer “Made Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-67.1” and listing requirements that “must be noted and fully and strictly complied with in order to accept this offer.” The dispute over whether Grange accepted reached a federal appeals court, which asked the Supreme Court of Georgia how the 2013 version of the statute applies.

The Court held that “OCGA § 9-11-67.1 does not prohibit a claimant from conditioning acceptance of a Pre-Suit Offer upon the performance of some act, including a timely payment,” and left the application to the facts to the federal court. Two justices dissented.

18. Wright v. Nelson (2021)

Wright v. Nelson, No. A20A1868, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided March 11, 2021

On the day he sued Howard Wright over a 2019 collision, John Nelson’s lawyer offered Wright’s insurer, Allstate, a limited liability release in exchange for the $25,000 limit, open until May 28, 2019. Allstate tendered the limit and said it would follow up with a release, but the parties never signed one, and the trial court refused to enforce a settlement.

A settlement had been formed. Nelson’s offer did not make presentation of a conforming release a precondition of acceptance, and Allstate’s correspondence sought his approval of the release rather than objecting to its terms, so the failure to sign was a matter of performance. “Because the undisputed record shows that Allstate accepted Nelson’s settlement offer, the trial court erred by denying Wright’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement according to those terms,” the court held, reversing.

19. Simmons v. Bates (2023)

Simmons v. Bates, No. A22A1460, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided January 13, 2023

Deborah Bates died after a July 2018 collision in which Judy Simmons allegedly ran a stop sign. Simmons had policies with two insurers, and in June 2019 the family sent a 39-page offer, with 30 footnotes, that obligated them to settle only if both insurers accepted. One insurer never received it; the other accepted and sent a check and documents. The trial court refused to enforce a settlement, and the version of § 9-11-67.1 then in effect governed.

One insurer’s compliance could not complete an offer addressed to two. The offer “unequivocally required the policy limits of both carriers to be tendered before Bates would execute any release at all,” so the refusal to enforce a settlement was affirmed. Simmons’s reliance on Brightman (No. 3) was misplaced, because that decision concerns an insurer’s liability for failing to settle, not whether an offer can be enforced.

20. Patrick v. Kingston (2024)

Patrick v. Kingston, No. A23A1527, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided February 13, 2024

Jennifer Patrick was killed in September 2020 when Megan Kingston’s car, traveling the wrong way on State Route 316, struck hers. In February 2021, under the version of § 9-11-67.1 that preceded the 2021 amendment, her family offered to settle for Progressive’s $25,000 limit, requiring as acts of acceptance timely payment and a release, and stating that no document, including the settlement check, could contain terms the offer did not permit. Progressive accepted “unconditionally, unequivocally and without variance,” but its check bore the words “VOID IF NOT PRESENTED WITHIN 90 DAYS.” The trial court enforced a settlement.

The 90-day legend was a variance. An offer that calls for an act can be accepted only by performing it, and when the recipient “fails to perform the act required to accept the offer, then the parties do not have a meeting of the minds.” The court rejected the argument that the check’s legend was immaterial because of banking law, and it noted that complaints about demands designed to trap insurers belong to the General Assembly. The enforcement order was reversed.

21. Redfearn v. Moore (2024)

Redfearn v. Moore, 371 Ga. App. 655, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided May 23, 2024

Jaade and Sierra Moore alleged that William Redfearn’s vehicle struck and killed their father as he waited with his disabled car in an interstate emergency lane. Their April 2022 pre-suit offer to Redfearn’s insurer, State Farm, required written acceptance of “each term and condition of this Offer” and treated payment and a conforming release as acts of acceptance. The check State Farm sent carried an added condition, and the trial court refused to enforce a settlement.

“Because the settlement check required an additional condition/restriction, the parties did not have a meeting of the minds,” the court held, following Patrick (No. 20), and it affirmed.

22. Gomez v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co. (2026)

Gomez v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co., 378 Ga. App. 702, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided February 13, 2026

The claimants’ offer to USAA, governed by the 2021 version of § 9-11-67.1, included terms beyond those the statute lists. USAA accepted in writing only the statutory material terms and rejected the others, and the trial court enforced the settlement. The opinion began by describing the pattern it saw in these disputes, in which a plaintiff’s attorney “includes onerous, byzantine terms in the hope of causing a botched acceptance.”

Under the 2021 version, a recipient can accept an offer on the statutory terms alone or agree to be bound by more; extra terms bind only if both sides agree to them in writing, and USAA had not. The settlement consisted of the statutory terms USAA accepted, and specific performance was a proper remedy. The judgment was affirmed.

23. Rowland v. McGovern (2026)

Rowland v. McGovern, Nos. A26A0116 and A26A0117, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided June 29, 2026

After a January 2022 collision, Kyle Zachary Rowland offered to settle with State Farm, which insured the other driver, for the policy limits. Beyond the statutory terms, the offer required payment within 45 days by a check payable to “Protentis Law LLC in trust for Kyle Rowland,” “without variance of any sort.” State Farm accepted the demand without limitation, but its check was made out with an added ampersand and stated that it “MUST BE ENDORSED BY ALL PAYEES.” Rowland treated that as a rejection, sued and won a substantial verdict; the trial court had refused to enforce a settlement.

Unlike the insurer in Gomez (No. 22), State Farm had agreed to the extra conditions by accepting the demand as a whole, and the 2021 amendment did not take away the freedom to agree in writing to such terms. Its nonconforming check was therefore a rejection, and no settlement was formed. The court also upheld the trial court’s refusal to backdate the judgment to the verdict date for post-judgment interest.

Statutory Penalties for Refusing to Pay

Section 33-4-6 (a) provides that when an insurer refuses in bad faith to pay a covered loss “within 60 days after a demand has been made by the holder of the policy,” the insurer is liable, in addition to the loss, for “not more than 50 percent of the liability of the insurer for the loss or $5,000.00, whichever is greater, and all reasonable attorney’s fees.” Section 33-4-7 imposes on motor vehicle liability insurers a duty to adjust property damage claims fairly and promptly. The seven decisions below apply both.

24. Mills v. Allstate Insurance Co. (2007)

Mills v. Allstate Insurance Co., 288 Ga. App. 257, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided November 6, 2007

Jason Mills, injured in a car wreck, sued the other car’s driver and owner and their insurer, Allstate, claiming that Allstate breached a duty to adjust his personal injury claim fairly and promptly under § 33-4-7. The trial court granted Allstate judgment on the pleadings.

“OCGA § 33-4-7 by its plain terms applies only to an insurer’s bad faith in responding to claims for property damage,” the court held, so a complaint about the handling of a personal injury claim stated no claim under it, and the judgment was affirmed.

25. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. v. Griffin (2010)

Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. v. Griffin, 302 Ga. App. 726, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided March 9, 2010

Thomas J. Griffin’s title insurance policy covered losses from title defects, and after he bought his land he learned that an easement serving it belonged to a neighbor. He demanded $364,000 for the lost value; Lawyers Title refused his later demand for bad faith damages, relying on an appraisal showing that the property was worth the same with or without the easement. A jury awarded Griffin $773,217.50.

The verdict could not stand, and the result was split. Because the insurer had already appealed the trial court’s summary judgment rulings and paid costs, the trial court had no power to change them and hold a trial, so the verdict was a nullity. Reviewing the original rulings, the court held that jury questions remained on whether Griffin suffered a covered loss, so the contract claim continued, but the bad faith claim failed: “Given that Lawyers’ nonpayment was based on its contention that Griffin did not have a covered loss under the Policy, Lawyers had a reasonable basis to refuse Griffin’s demand.”

26. Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Neisler (2015)

Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Neisler, 334 Ga. App. 284, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided October 30, 2015

Jason Neisler owned 37 rental homes, and one of them was burglarized in May 2013 before he found a tenant; the thieves took the water heater, heating and cooling units and wiring. The stolen items were not covered, but Neisler claimed the damage the burglars caused and his lost rent, and sought bad faith penalties.

The penalty claim survived in part. Penalties are “not authorized where the insurance company has any reasonable ground to contest the claim and where there is a disputed question of fact”; the insurer had a complete defense to the lost-rent claim, so no penalty could attach to it. On the burglary damage, the insurer had been told of ambiguities in the policy language, so the court could not say as a matter of law that it had reasonable grounds to refuse, and that part of the claim remained.

27. Amica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sanders (2015)

Amica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sanders, 335 Ga. App. 245, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided November 16, 2015

Amica’s insured hit Ullaine and Stephanie Sanders’s car, and Amica offered them $716.25 for the car’s diminished value, using a formula developed after the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision requiring insurers to pay for lost value. The Sanderses brought a bad faith claim of the kind that, as the court explained, “OCGA § 33-4-7 allows third parties to bring … directly against insurers in certain limited circumstances,” and the trial court denied Amica partial summary judgment.

A formula alone was not evidence of bad faith. The adjuster’s use of it could not, “in the absence of any other evidence of bad faith,” support the claim, and the denial of summary judgment was reversed.

28. Clary v. Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. (2017)

Clary v. Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Co., 340 Ga. App. 351, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided February 2, 2017

Lightning set fire to John and Cathy Clary’s lakeside home in August 2010, and Allstate managed the repairs until the parties disagreed about how to remove mold. Allstate demanded an appraisal under the policy and paid the amount the appraisers set, and the Clarys sued on many theories, including fraud, negligence, emotional distress and attorney fees.

Among the rulings for Allstate that the court affirmed was its holding that because § 33-4-6 provides “a specific procedure and a limited penalty for bad faith failure to pay insurance claims,” that penalty is exclusive, and “recovery under general penalty provisions such as OCGA § 13-6-11 is not allowed for bad faith failure to pay insurance claims.”

29. American Reliable Insurance Co. v. Lancaster (2020)

American Reliable Insurance Co. v. Lancaster, No. A20A0869, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided October 2, 2020

Charlie and Wanda Lancaster bought farm owners insurance through a local agent in December 2013 and paid their premiums to that agent. After a fire destroyed their property, American Reliable denied the claim, saying the policy had been canceled for nonpayment, and the trial court denied it summary judgment.

Without coverage there could be no penalty. A § 33-4-6 claim requires proof “(1) that the claim is covered under the policy, (2) that a demand for payment was made against the insurer within 60 days prior to filing suit, and (3) that the insurer’s failure to pay was motivated by bad faith,” and because the Lancasters could not show coverage, the penalty claim failed as a matter of law. The denial of summary judgment was reversed.

30. Montgomery v. Travelers Home & Marine Insurance Co. (2021)

Montgomery v. Travelers Home & Marine Insurance Co., No. A21A0104, Court of Appeals of Georgia, decided June 9, 2021

Travelers denied Mary Agnes Montgomery’s claim for water damage in her basement because a structural engineer advised that groundwater, which her policy excluded, caused it. She argued that both the adjuster’s investigation and the engineer’s analysis were flawed.

A genuine coverage dispute can defeat a bad faith claim. Fact disputes about coverage were for a jury, but that is a separate question from bad faith, and “the existence of factual disputes regarding policy coverage supports Travelers’s argument that it is entitled to summary judgment on the bad faith claims.” There was no evidence that the engineer’s advice was “patently wrong” or that the insurer’s reliance on it was “merely pretextual,” and summary judgment for Travelers on the penalty claim was affirmed.

Selection Notes

The page draws on 30 decisions of the two Georgia appellate courts. Before a Court of Appeals decision was used, its closing lines were read to confirm that no judge concurred only in the judgment or specially without joining the opinion, which would make it physical precedent. One decision first considered, the Court of Appeals’ 2008 ruling in the Fortner case, was replaced by the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision reversing it (No. 5). Where a case was decided on a motion to dismiss, as in No. 10, the facts are those alleged; elsewhere they are the evidence as the court viewed it. Reporter citations appear only where they were found in the reporter text or cited in a published opinion. Later treatment of each decision was checked only as far as later decisions on this page discuss it. Research ran through September 2026.

Legislation Cited

Senate Bill 83 (2024), as passed, Georgia General Assembly

Summary of General Statutes Enacted at the 2nd Session of the 157th General Assembly (2024), Georgia Office of Legislative Counsel

Summary of General Statutes Enacted at the 1st Session of the 158th General Assembly (2025), Georgia Office of Legislative Counsel

Summary of General Statutes Enacted at the 2nd Session of the 158th General Assembly (2026), Georgia Office of Legislative Counsel

Use of This Page

These summaries are general information about published court decisions, not legal advice, and they do not assess any policy, claim or settlement offer. Insurance disputes turn on the policy language, the facts and the version of each statute in effect at the time, and later legislation or decisions may have changed the rules described here.